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Abstract of thesis entitled 
Exploring the Effect of School Closure in Mitigating Transmission of 
Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 in Hong Kong 
 School closure is often included in national pandemic influenza response plans as 
a community mitigation measure and it was widely applied in Pandemic (H1N1) 2009. 
However, the appropriateness of this intervention is often questioned, as school closure 
causes major disruption to the education system and past epidemiological studies reveal 
this intervention is not necessarily effective. The present thesis evaluates the effect of 
school closure in mitigating transmission of Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 in Hong Kong in 
the initial 5 months of the pandemic. 
 
 In Hong Kong, following identification of the pandemic virus in US in April 2009, 
the government implemented containment phase measures and began surveillance on 
the pandemic. The Centre for Health Protection established a reporting criteria for 
doctors to report suspected cases of pandemic infection for laboratory confirmation, 
and the source of infection of confirmed cases was traced to determine if the pandemic 
was spreading locally. When local transmission of the pandemic began in June, the 
government began mitigation phase measures, in which patients with influenza-like- 
illness seeking treatment at designated flu clinics and public hospital emergency 
departments were tested for pandemic infection, and school closure was implemented 
for pandemic mitigation. The school closure policy lasted until summer holiday 
commenced in July, and was revised and continued in September when the new school 
season started. At the end of September, in view of pandemic surveillance was no 
longer useful, laboratory testing for suspected pandemic cases was halted. Patient 
demographic data collected from confirmed pandemic cases, together with temporal 
changes in school session induced by school closure and summer holiday, provided an 
ideal opportunity for investigation.  
 From May through September 2009, a total of 27,687 pandemic cases were 
confirmed, in which the age and confirmation date were recorded in all cases, and 88% 
provided a locatable residential address. To visualise the mitigative effect of school 
closure, 5 socio-economic age classes (which include primary and secondary 
school-aged children) were defined, and age-class-and-district-specific epidemic 
curves were constructed. All epidemic curves rose steadily after local transmission 
began in June, and an unusual upsurge in the epidemic curve of primary and secondary 
school-aged children is observed when schools resumed session in September, 
suggesting school session facilitated transmission amongst them.  
  
 Previously, the effect of school closure in mitigating Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 
transmission in Hong Kong was investigated in Wu et al. (2010a). By analysing 
surveillance data collected as of 27 August with an age-structured susceptible- 
infectious-recovered (SIR) model, the study reported transmission was reduced by 25% 
when summer holiday commenced. In this study, I adapted the methodology in Wu et al. 
(2010a) to analyse data collected in the entire surveillance period. Upon observing the 
model fitted poorly to the additional data, I added 2 transmission features to the model 
(which include increased transmission between children and adults during school 
closure) to better represent the epidemic in reality. My analysis revealed that while 
school closure reduced incidence in children, it increased incidence in adults, leading to 
a reduction in overall transmission by only 7.6% when summer holiday started. The 
findings of this study suggest that school closure in a future influenza pandemic is 
unlikely to be able to delay the pandemic for vaccine to arrive in time, and that 
implementing this intervention may increase incidence in adults, which may lead to 




而這項措施亦在 2009 年 H1N1 流感大流行中被廣泛地使用。然而，這項緩疫措
施經常被質疑是否恰當，原因是因為停課會對教育構成重大的影響，而且過往的
流行病學硏究亦表示這項緩疫措施不一定有效。本論文硏究學校停課對 2009 年
H1N1 流感大流行在香港首 5 個月疫情中降低大流行流感傳播的效能。 
 













  在 2009 年的 5 月至 9 月，一共確診了 27,687 宗大流行流感個案。在確診個
案中，所有個案都記錄了確診者的年歲和確診日期，而 88%確診者提供了一個可
定位的住宅地址。為了觀察學校停課的緩疫效果，本硏究定義了 5 個社會經濟年






 先前，學校停課對減低 2009 年 H1N1 流感大流行在香港的傳播已被 Wu et. al 
(2010a)進行了調查。透過使用一個具年齡結構的 SIR 模型(age-structured SIR model)
來分析收集至 8 月 27 日的監測數據，該硏究表示流感大流行的傳播在暑假開始
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Chapter 1  
Introduction 
 
 Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 is the World Health Organisation (WHO) official name 
for the 2009 influenza pandemic. In this thesis, we will evaluate the effect of school 
closure in mitigating Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 transmission in Hong Kong in the initial 5 
months of the pandemic. Although school closure was applied in various nations to 
mitigate Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 transmission, evidence underpinning the effect of this 
intervention was generally considered inconclusive (Berkman, 2008, Cauchemez et al., 
2009). Therefore evaluating the effect of this intervention was named by the WHO as 
one of the public health challenges need be addressed in this pandemic (Van Kerkhove 
et al., 2009). For ease of reference, I shall refer to the ex-pandemic virus as the “Human 
Swine Influenza virus”, or “HSI virus” for short, instead of its WHO official name 
“pandemic H1N1/09 virus”, as this name is used by medical authorities in Hong Kong 
and I find this name less cumbersome and logically more intuitive. 
 
 This chapter provides background information for this study and is organised as 
follows: Section 1.1 gives a general introduction to influenza epidemiology and its 
control and prevention. Section 1.2 outlines national public health response to 
pandemic influenza and highlight the need for research on using school closure as one 
such intervention. Section 1.3 describes details of Pandemic (H1N1) 2009. Section 1.4 
outlines interventions implemented in Hong Kong for the pandemic, which is the basis 
of this study. Section 1.5 states the research objective and outlines the organisation of 
this thesis.  
 




1.1.1 Influenza viruses 
Classification 
 Influenza is the infection of the respiratory tract caused by influenza viruses. 
Influenza viruses are single strand, negative sense RNA viruses that belong to the 
orthomyxoviridae family. Based on antigenic properties of their matrix proteins and 
nucleoproteins, influenza viruses are classified into 3 types: influenza virus type A, B 
and C, respectively (Nicholson et al., 1998). All 3 influenza virus types are known to 
infect human, yet influenza A and B viruses are responsible for the majority of human 
infections. Influenza A viruses are further classified into subtypes by antigenic 
properties of their surface proteins Haemagglutinin (HA or H) and Neuraminidase (NA 
or N). So far, 16 HA and 9 NA subtypes have been identified and only subtypes H1-3, 
N1-2 are known to circulate in human (Fouchier et al., 2005). Influenza A virus 
subtypes and influenza B viruses are further classified into strains, since individuals 
immune to one strain are still susceptible to other strains of the same type or subtype. 
Since influenza A, B, C viruses differ in virus structure, ecology and epidemiology and 
influenza A viruses are believed to the only type that cause pandemics (Webster et al., 
1992), I shall only focus on influenza A viruses in this introduction. 
 
Structure of the Influenza A virus 
 Figure 1.1 shows the structure of the influenza A virus virion. The influenza A 
virus is consist of a segmented genome encapsulated in a double membrane envelope 
embedded by surface proteins. The genome is consist of 8 single strand, negative 
sensed RNA gene segments that are together known to encode 11 proteins (HA, NA, NP, 
M1, M2, NS1, NEP, PA, PB1, PB1-F2, and PB2). Each gene is named by the protein 
which it encodes and their names are HA, NA, M, NS, NP PB1, PB2 and PA. Humoral 
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immunity against influenza is dependent on the recognition of the virus‟s HA and NA 
proteins by host antibodies (hence the Influenza A virus subtypes). Due to the 
segmented nature of the genome, besides point mutation and recombination, influenza 
A viruses can also evolve by reassortment, which is the shuffling gene segments of 2 
strains of influenza A viruses in the generation of a new influenza A virus. 
 
 
Figure 1.1  Structure of the Influenza A virus virion. (Captured from Webster et al. (1992) 
Ecology 
 Influenza A viruses have a wide ecology and are found in a variety of animal hosts 
including avian (birds), swine (pigs), equine (horses) and human. Since wild aquatic 
birds (e.g. mallard, goose, gull) host all 16 influenza A virus HA subtypes, they are 
thought to be the primordial host of influenza A viruses (Webster et al., 1992). Usually, 
influenza A virus that infect one host species transmits primarily within the population 
of that species, but occasionally cross-species transmission occurs and the cross-species 
transmitted virus may become adapted in the new host and cause outbreaks in its 
population. Examples of this include the 1997 influenza outbreak in terrestrial poultry 
(e.g. chicken, turkey) in Hong Kong caused by influenza A/H5N1 viruses that originate 
from aquatic birds, and the recent 2009 influenza pandemic in human caused by 
influenza viruses that originate from swine.  
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1.1.2 Influenza Epidemiology 
Symptoms & Natural History of Infection 
 Influenza in human is usually caused by human influenza viruses which only 
circulate in the human population and generally cause mild and self-limited illness. 
Individuals infected would typically undergo an incubation period of 1-2 days, 
followed by onset of symptoms characterised by fever, headache, cough, sore throat 
and malaise, that would typically last for days until the individual fully recovers. In 
worse cases, the infection may progress to viral pneumonia or it may trigger other 
complications, which happens most frequently in children (age 6), elderly (age 65) , 
pregnant women and immunocompromised individuals (they are collectively referred 
as the „influenza high-risk groups‟). Since asymptomatic influenza infection is known 
to occur, not all influenza infected individuals manifest symptoms. Occasionally, 
individuals may become infected by an influenza virus strain that belong to other 
animal species after exposure and the infection may lead to fatal illnesses. For example, 
human infections of avian influenza A/H5N1 is known to have a case fatality ratio 
(CFR) of 56% (World Health Organisation, 2006). Nonetheless, such infection rarely 
occurs, hence influenza is generally a non-severe disease to human. 
Mode of Transmission 
 Influenza transmission in human is known to proceed in 3 modes: via direct 
contact with infected individuals; via contact with formites; and via inhalation of 
virus-laden aerosols produced from the coughs and sneezes of an infected person. In the 
airborne mode, tiny aerosols (1-4 µm in diameter) known as droplet-nuclei are known 
to be capable of suspending in the air for a long time and travel over long distances. The 
relative importance of each transmission mode is not known, however, it is widely 
believed that influenza transmits primarily over short distances and long distance 
transmission (via droplet-nuclei) rarely happens (Nicholson et al., 1998). 
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Seasonal and Pandemic Influenza 
 Influenza is classified into 2 epidemiological forms: seasonal and pandemic. 
Seasonal influenza refers to the annually reoccurring influenza epidemics caused by 
influenza viruses that circulate in human. In most nations, influenza cases are observed 
to rise and fall at specific times of the year, with duration typically of 3-4 months and a 
peak of 5 folds or higher in magnitude compared to baseline. Intriguingly, influenza 
season is observed to differ by climate and geographic location. For instance, influenza 
season in the northern hemisphere is between November-March; in the southern 
hemisphere is between April-September; and in the tropics and subtropics influenza 
activity is present throughout the year (Nicholson et al., 1998). Seasonal influenza 
viruses are known to mutate rapidly. From time to time, new strains emerge and replace 
existing strains, and new strains are capable of escaping host immunity from past 
infection (or vaccination) and cause re-infection. The mechanism that causes the 
seasonal pattern of influenza is unknown, but it is postulated to be related to climate, 
human social behaviour, host immunity and virus evolution (Lofgren et al., 2007). 
 
 Pandemic influenza refers to a global influenza outbreak caused by an influenza 
virus strain which the majority of the human population have little or no immunity 
against. Such virus usually arises when an animal influenza virus evolves to become 
capable of transmitting efficiently amongst human. As the majority of the world‟s 
population is susceptible to infection, the pandemic virus spreads extensively in the 
human population, causing substantial morbidity and mortality globally that may 
disrupt the functioning of societies and overload health systems. In contrast to seasonal 
influenza, pandemic influenza occurs irregularly, and the course of a pandemic usually 
lasts for over a year. In the past century, at least 4 influenza pandemics have occurred: 
the 1918 A/H1N1 pandemic (Spanish flu), the 1957 A/H2N2 pandemic (Asian flu), the 
1968 A/H3N2 pandemic (Hong Kong flu), and the 2009 A/H1N1 pandemic (Pandemic 
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(H1N1) 2009 or Mexican flu). Past experience shows that an influenza pandemic may 
unfold in a population as a single epidemic wave or as multiple epidemic waves 
(usually less than 3), and once a pandemic has run its course, the pandemic virus would 
continue to circulate in human as a seasonal strain and it may replace existing seasonal 
strains. Of all influenza pandemics, the 1918 pandemic was the most devastating – it is 
estimated that the pandemic virus infection has a CFR of roughly 2.5% and at least 40 
million deaths were claimed globally in the pandemic (Nicholson et al., 1998). 
 
 
1.1.3 Influenza control and prevention 
Public health surveillance 
 To monitor seasonal influenza virus activities and to detect emergence of new 
influenza viruses (which may develop into a pandemic), most developed nations 
implement influenza surveillance. Since influenza symptoms overlap with those of the 
common cold and other respiratory illnesses which makes laboratory testing necessary 
for diagnosis, influenza surveillance is usually conducted in 2 parts: laboratory 
surveillance and clinical surveillance. Clinical surveillance is conducted through 
monitoring the number of cases with Influenza-like-illness (ILI) or Acute-respiratory- 
illness (ARI) usually at hospital general outpatient clinics or at selected sentinel sites, 
whilst laboratory surveillance is conducted through laboratory-testing a fraction of 
suspected influenza cases to determine the proportion of cases that are actually 
influenza and the influenza virus strains that are currently circulating (the latter is also 
referred as „virological surveillance‟). Virological surveillance data on seasonal 





Seasonal influenza vaccination 
 To reduce the health burden associated with seasonal influenza, most developed 
nations provide seasonal influenza vaccination to influenza high-risk groups to reduce 
their chance of infection. The vaccine used for seasonal influenza vaccination is usually 
a trivalent-influenza-vaccine (TIV) formulated to target the A/H1N1, A/H3N2 and type 
B strain predicted to be the dominant strain in next influenza season. Prediction on the 
dominant seasonal strain is made by the WHO Global Influenza Surveillance Response 
System (GISRS), who makes the prediction based on virological surveillance data 
gathered from globally. Due to the high mutation rate of the influenza virus, protection 
conferred from seasonal vaccination usually lasts for only 1 or 2 influenza seasons. 
Therefore seasonal influenza vaccine needs be reformulated regularly, and individuals 
are recommended to take the vaccine annually to stay protected.  
 
Influenza antivirals 
 Influenza can be treated and prevented with antivirals. Influenza antivirals are 
grouped by their mechanism into 2 classes: the M2-inhibitors and the NA-inhibitors. 
The NA-inhibitors, which include the antiviral Oseltamivir and Zanamivir, are effective 
against both Influenza A and B, whilst the M2-inhibitors (aka. Adamantanes), which 
include the antiviral Amantadine and Rimantadine, are only effective against influenza 
A (since Influenza B do not possess M2). Administration of antivirals within 48 hours 
after symptom onset is known to reduce the duration of symptoms, whilst pre- and 
post-exposure administration is known to offer prophylaxis. Antiviral resistance occurs 
to both classes of antivirals, nonetheless, NA-inhibitors are usually preferred over 
M2-inhibitors since they are more effective and are known to cause less adverse effects. 




1.2 Public health response to pandemic influenza & School closure 
1.2.1 Public health response to pandemic influenza 
 In the last 2 decades, human infections of avian influenza A/H5N1 were 
increasingly identified in Southeast Asia and other parts of the world, raising major 
concerns over the possibility of an influenza A/H5N1 pandemic (Webby and Webster, 
2003, World Health Organisation, 2006). This consequently led nations and the WHO 
to develop pandemic influenza preparedness and response plans (referred hereafter as 
„pandemic preparedness plans‟) to prepare for such a pandemic should it occur. For 
preparedness, most developed nations have stockpiled influenza antivirals and personal 
protective equipment to prevent shortage of supplies during pandemic. For response, 
pandemic preparedness plans guide implementation of public health interventions 
during a pandemic to mitigate its spread in the community.  
 
 Intervention for controlling influenza spread are classified into pharmaceutical 
interventions (PI) and non-pharmaceutical interventions (NPI). PI refers to the use of 
vaccines and antivirals, whilst NPI refers to measures that are not PI and these include 
isolation of confirmed cases, quarantine of potentially infected cases and other social 
distancing measures such as banning of mass gathering and school closure. In the early 
phases of an influenza pandemic, since influenza vaccine production by current 
technologies requires at least 6 months (Lambert and Fauci, 2010) and antivirals are 
usually in limited supplies or the pandemic virus may already be resistant, NPIs are the 
primary options for pandemic mitigation. The current approach to pandemic mitigation 
in most nations is usually to apply NPIs to delay the spread of the pandemic until 
vaccine arrival, though significant concerns remain over the actual benefits of such 
approach as implementation of NPI do cause significant inconvenience to the public 
and the pandemic is likely to be largely over by the time vaccine arrives. 
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WHO Pandemic Phases 
 In the WHO pandemic preparedness plan, 8 pandemic phases are defined to 
signify the risk of an imminent influenza pandemic for coordinating national 
pandemic responses (Figure 1.2). Each phase is activated upon occurrence of certain 
pandemic-development related events: In brief, Phase 1-3 signals for low risk and are 
activated when an influenza virus strain that does not normally infect human causes 
sporadic human infections. Phase 4 is activated when the condition in Phase 3 
develops into community-level outbreaks, and activation of this phase signifies a 
forthcoming influenza pandemic is likely and nations should attempt to contain the 
virus if possible. From Phase 4 onwards, the phase level will be raised according to 
the geographic spread of the virus: it will be raised to phase 5 when community 
outbreak occurs in more than 1 country, and to phase 6 when community outbreak 
occurs in more than 1 WHO region. Activation of Phase 6 signifies an influenza 
pandemic is currently underway. Once the pandemic wave in most countries begins to 
drop, the Post-Peak phase, which signals that the pandemic is subsiding but it is 
uncertain whether additional waves will emerge, will be activated. At last, once it is 
thought that no further pandemic waves will emerge, the Post-Pandemic phase will be 
activated, which officially declares the pandemic virus a seasonal influenza strain. 
 
 




1.2.2 School Closure 
Rationale for school closure and implementation in pandemic preparedness plans 
 School closure is one NPI often included in pandemic preparedness plans to 
mitigate pandemic transmission in the community. The rationale for school closure is 
that children are believed to play an important role in influenza transmission, and their 
high contact frequencies at schools is thought to facilitate transmission amongst them. 
It is therefore hoped that closing schools during an influenza pandemic would reduce 
transmission amongst children and subsequently in the community, thus bringing the 
benefits of delaying the epidemic to give more time for vaccine production and 
lowering the incidence at epidemic peak to relieve the impact on the healthcare system 
and society (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2007). In pandemic 
preparedness plans, school closure is often implemented in 2 ways: reactive and 
proactive. Reactive school closure refers to closing the school which outbreak was 
detected in, whilst proactive school closure refers to closing schools (usually all) within 
the region which the pandemic virus was detected in. 
 
Problems associated with school closure 
 While school closure during an influenza pandemic may bring health benefits, 
several problems are associated with applying this intervention. First, school closure, if 
implemented for a long period, would cause major disruption to the education system, 
delay school schedule and may cause inequity to students involved in public 
examinations. Second, school closure causes childcare issues to working parents, 
which may restrict them from attending work for looking after their children and may 
affect household income. Third, legal and ethical issues also arise with applying this 
intervention, as law in most jurisdictions do not explicitly authorise school closure for 
public health purposes (Hodge, 2009) and the adverse effects of school closure (e.g. 
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education interruption, income loss) are usually unevenly distributed in the society 
(Berkman, 2008). Furthermore, there are also challenges in public communication, 
acceptance and compliance to school closure, and other operational issues such as 
„when, how and how long‟ schools should be closed, when should schools re-open, are 
also present. 
 
Evidence on the effect of school closure in reducing influenza transmission 
 As mentioned above, a number of problems are associated with school closure. 
Hence, the decision to implement school closure for pandemic mitigation should be 
made based on robust and concrete evidence supporting the effectiveness of this 
intervention. However, it is generally considered amongst the scientific community that 
the evidence supporting the effect of school closure is not firmly established, and 
significant uncertainty remains in the actual effectiveness of this intervention if applied 
in a future influenza pandemic (Aledort et al., 2007, Cauchemez et al., 2009, World 
Health Organization Writing Group, 2006, Berkman, 2008). Table 1.1 provides a brief 
review on past seasonal and pandemic influenza studies that are related to the effect of 
school closure in reducing transmission. In general, it is considered that school closure 
may have reduced mortality in the 1918 pandemic, however it remains uncertain if the 
conclusion still applies in the modern era as it happened over 90 years ago, whilst 
seasonal influenza investigations reported both positive and negative findings. 
Therefore it was highlighted by the WHO at the start of Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 that 
evaluating the effectiveness of school closure is one of the public health challenges 






Table 1.1  Evidence on the effect of school closure in reducing influenza transmission from seasonal and pandemic influenza  




Pandemic influenza     
US 1918 pandemic 
(Markel et al., 2007) 
NPIs (school closure, banning of mass gatherings, case 
isolation, hygiene measures), were implemented in 44 US 
cities with various durations 
Cities implemented NPIs 
earlier, longer had fewer 
weekly excess deaths  
May be 
Confounded by other 
NPIs. Uncertain if 
conclusion still hold in 
the modern era 
Seasonal influenza     
Hong Kong 2008 
(Cowling et al., 2008) 
Kindergartens and primary schools closed for 2 weeks after 
influenza-associated death occurred in 2 children. Compared 
ILI time series in 2008 against that in the past 10 years 
No significant ILI 
reduction during closure 
period 
No visible effect 
(possibly due to 
closing too late) 
 
Hong Kong 2003 
(Lo et al., 2005) 
NPIs (school closure, banning of mass gathering, hand 
hygiene, wearing of face mask) were implemented during the 
SARS outbreak in 2003. Compared time series of 
laboratory-confirmed influenza isolates in 2009 against that 
in the past 5 years 
Influenza isolates in 




(Cauchemez et al., 
2008) 
School holiday in 3 zones of France start at different time. 
Inferred effect of school holiday on influenza transmission 
from ILI cases in children collected at sentinel sites from 
1984-2006 at the 3 different zones with a model 





(Heymann et al., 2004) 
(Heymann et al., 2009 ) 
School closure for 12 days caused by teacher strike. 
Compared daily ILI case in children and in all-ages before, 
during and after school closure by analysis-of-variance) 
ILI cases in children and 
all-ages lower during 
school closure 
Likely 
Sensitive to seasonality 




1.3 Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 
1.3.1 Course of the pandemic 
Emergence of the pandemic 
 The HSI virus was first identified in the United States on 17 April 2009 by the 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (USCDC) from 2 febrile children residing 
in California (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2009b). Analysis revealed 
that both infections were caused by an influenza virus of subtype A/H1N1 that was 
antigenically distinct from the seasonal influenza A/H1N1 virus strain, and subsequent 
analysis revealed that the virus contained a unique combination of gene segments that 
had never been identified in human nor animals and its gene segments were closely 
related to those of avian influenza viruses (PA, PB2), human influenza A/H3N2 virus 
(PB1) and swine influenza viruses circulating in North America (HA, PB2) and in 
Eurasia (NA,M, NS). Based on sequence similarity to previous swine influenza isolates, 
USCDC concluded that the novel influenza virus had most likely emerged through 
reassortment between the North American swine influenza viruses and Eurasian swine 
influenza viruses (Figure 1.3). With both patients reported having no recent contact 
with swine, the findings suggested that the novel influenza virus was capable of 
transmitting amongst human. Based on these findings, WHO activated pandemic phase 
4 on 27 April 2009. Meanwhile, USCDC continued to confirm infection of the novel 
influenza virus across multiple states in the US and began to investigate on an unusual 
ILI outbreak in Mexico that started since early March. On 23 April, after USCDC 
confirmed novel influenza virus infection in 7 out of 14 sample collected from the 
Mexican outbreak, it was evident that the novel influenza virus was transmitting 
amongst humans and the cases observed in the US was likely to be the consequence of 
the epidemic in Mexico spreading over to the US (Centers for Disease Control and 




Figure 1.3  Presumed evolutionary history of the HSI virus (captured from (Lam, 2010)) 
The HSI virus is believed to have emerged through reassortment between Eurasian swine influenza 
A/H1N1 viruses and the North American swine influenza viruses. 
 
 After USCDC reported identification of the HSI virus on 21 April 2009, nations 
across the world quickly strengthened health measures at airports and international 
borders and began local surveillance on HSI. Travel restriction was not recommended 
by WHO but people with ILI symptoms were advised to delay international travel until 
recovery. By the 6
th
 week (29 May) since the discovery of the HSI virus, the virus had 
spread to at least 53 countries across multiple continents, and community-level 
transmission began to emerge amongst the affected countries (World Health 
Organisation, 2009a). On 11 June 2009, in view of HSI community-level transmission 
took place in more than 1 WHO regions which satisfied the requirement for pandemic 
phase 6, WHO activated the pandemic level and officially declared that the world is at 
start of another influenza pandemic (World Health Organisation, 2009e). 
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First wave and End of pandemic 
 In countries with clinical influenza surveillance, the first wave of the pandemic in 
most countries continued to climb from July through September, began to peak around 
September-October and started to decline in October-November (World Health 
Organisation, 2009b). Some countries (such as Australia) experienced a one-wave 
epidemic, whilst other countries (such as the UK, US) experienced a two-wave 
epidemic. By November-December 2009, the first batch pandemic vaccine became 
available and were began to be distributed internationally. By mid-2010, activities of 
the HSI virus persisted in most countries but generally remained at a low level . On 10 
August 2010, in view of HSI activities in most countries were low and exhibited a 
similar pattern to seasonal influenza, WHO officially declared the start of the 
Post-Pandemic phase for Pandemic (H1N1) 2009, ending the 2009 influenza pandemic 
after 14 months (World Health Organisation, 2010).  
 
1.3.2 Epidemiological characteristics of the HSI virus 
 To much surprise, the HSI virus generally caused mild and non-severe infections. 
Individuals infected develop symptoms including fever, headache, cough and malaise, 
and most infected cases recovered uneventfully within days without the need of 
treatment. Laboratory testing showed the novel influenza virus was resistant to 
M2-inhibitor antivirals but remained susceptible to NA-inhibitor antivirals. One 
distinctive feature of the HSI virus was its high attack rate in the younger aged 
population, with initial investigations on HSI outbreaks observed that more than 60% 
of ILI cases (thought to be related to HSI) were aged below 18 (Fraser et al., 2009, 
Novel Swine-Origin Influenza A (H1N1) Virus Investigation Team, 2009), and 
outbreaks were observed to occur in schools (Lessler et al., 2009, Kawaguchi et al., 
2009). Infection in persons aged over 60 was observed to be low, and it was later 
revealed from achieved serological samples that elderly had pre-existing antibodies 
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against HSI infection (Hancock et al., 2009). The basic reproductive number (R0) of the 
HSI virus estimated in most countries ranged from 1.3-1.7 (Writing Committee of the 
WHO Consultation on Clinical Aspects of Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 Influenza, 2010). 
CFR of HSI infection was initially estimated from confirmed and probably case counts 
to range from 0.03% to 1.8% (Fraser et al., 2009), and was later revealed from serologic 
data to be much lower than initially estimated – 0.0004% in persons aged 5-14 and 
0.0265% in persons aged 50-59 (Wu et al., 2010b). In general, epidemiological 
characteristics of the HSI virus is considered similar to that of seasonal influenza in that 








1.4 Hong Kong‟s response to Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 
1.4.1 Hong Kong‟s pandemic influenza preparedness and response plan 
 In Hong Kong, the control and prevention of communicable diseases is directed by 
the Centre for Health Protection (CHP) of the Department of Health. In 2005, CHP 
released the document “Framework of Government‟s Preparedness Plan for Pandemic 
Influenza” to guide implementation of control measures against an avian influenza 
pandemic (Centre for Health Protection, 2005). The framework incorporates a 
three-level response system: Alert, Serious, Emergency, where each level depicts a set 
of epidemiological scenarios that signal for the threat of an avian influenza epidemic in 
Hong Kong and prescribes appropriate response action required in each scenario. Table 
1.2 shows the scenarios depicted in each response level and the prescribed response 
action that are relevant to Pandemic (H1N1) 2009. 
 
 To control and prevent the spread of a potential influenza pandemic, the Hong 
Kong government may implement the following response actions: Port health measures 
at airport and border crossings may be enhanced to screen for febrile travellers; Locally, 
influenza surveillance activities at local public and private hospital may be enhanced to 
detect for potential cases of pandemic virus infection; The Public Health Laboratory 
Services Branch (PHLSB) of CHP, who are responsible for the provision of laboratory 
diagnostic services for communicable diseases to local hospitals, may enhance its work 
capacity to provide laboratory surveillance for the pandemic; Contact tracing may be 
performed to identify the source of infection for each confirmed case and to isolate their 
contacts whom may have been infected; The e-flu information system may be activated 
to store demographics of confirmed cases to support real-time surveillance and analysis; 
Local outpatient clinics may be converted to designated clinics for treating ILI patients; 
Social distancing measures such as closure of schools, public places and public services 
 18 
 
may be applied. If necessary, the government may declare the pandemic virus infection 
a statutory notifiable disease, which requires healthcare professionals to timely report 
suspected and confirmed cases of pandemic virus infection to CHP by law. 
 
Table 1.2  Hong Kong Government‟s preparedness plan framework for pandemic influenza. 






(relevant to Pandemic (H1N1) 2009) 
Alert  Confirmed human case of avian 
influenza outside Hong Kong 
 
 Forward all specimens positive for influenza A 
virus from cases with suspicion of avian influenza 
to PHLSB for confirmation 
Serious  Confirmed human case of avian 
influenza inside Hong Kong 
without evidence of efficient 
human-human transmission 
 
 Continue control measures taken at the Alert 
response level where appropriate 
 Enhance surveillance activities in public and 
private hospitals on cases due to the novel§ 
influenza virus 
 Conduct epidemiological investigation to 
determine whether the case acquired infection 
locally or outside Hong Kong 
 Activate ‘e-flu’ information system to enable the 
monitoring of influenza cases in real-time. 
 Conduct rapid avian influenza testing on ILI and 
pneumonia cases 
 Enhance laboratory capacity of PHLSB for 
confirming all rapid test positive cases  
 Modify port health measures in light of WHO 
latest guidelines  
 Set up designated clinics for influenza treatment 
Emergency  Evidence of a novel
§
 strain of 
influenza virus capable of 
efficient human-human 
transmission 
 WHO pandemic phase 6 
 
 Continue control measures taken at the Serious 
response level where appropriate 
 Monitor daily number of influenza isolates from 
PHLSB 
 Monitor daily number of patients seen at 
hospital Accident and Emergency departments 
 Mobilise outpatient clinics as designated clinics 
for influenza treatment 
 Assess the need for closure of schools, public 
places and services. 
§ A novel influenza virus strain is a strain which has either never circulated or for many years not circulated in human. 
 PHLSB – Public Health Laboratory Service Branch of the Centre for Health Protection 
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1.4.2 Hong Kong‟s response to Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 
Containment phase (1 May – June 29) 
 Following identification of the HSI virus in the US in April 2009, the Hong Kong 
government immediately activated the Serious response level for pandemic influenza 
on 26 April and declared HSI a statutory notifiable disease on 27 April. As part of the 
Serious phase protocol, port health measures were enhanced, and locally, enhanced 
surveillance mechanisms was implemented, in which a reporting criteria (Appendix 1) 
was sent to all doctors in Hong Kong for the reporting of suspected cases of HSI 
infection to CHP for laboratory confirmation and further case management, and 
epidemiological investigations were conducted for each confirmed case to determine 
the source of infection. Each patient confirmed of HSI infection was classified as an 
“imported case” if the patient had either recently travelled to an HSI-affected country or 
had had contact with a confirmed HSI infectee who was already an imported case. The 
e-flu information system was activated to store demographics of confirmed HSI cases 
to support contact tracing and real-time epidemic surveillance. On 1 May, following 
identification of the first imported case in Hong Kong, the government immediately 
activated the Emergency response level and implemented containment phase measures 
in hope to delay local transmission of HSI for as long as possible: All confirmed HSI 
cases were medically isolated for 2 weeks in public hospitals and were usually 
prescribed oseltamivir for treatment, whilst their close contacts were traced and 
quarantined for 1 week in hotels and holiday camps and were prescribed oseltamivir for 
prophylaxis. To closely inform the public on the latest local pandemic situation, CHP 
announced on a daily basis the number of cases newly confirmed, hospitalised and 
deaths associated with HSI. Remarkably, local transmission of HSI appeared to be 
contained in the initial 40 days (1 May – 9 June) as all HSI cases identified were 
imported cases.  
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Mitigation phase (10 June onwards) 
 When the first non-imported case was identified on 10 June, the government 
immediately implemented mitigation phase measures and gradually ceased measures 
from the containment phase: Starting on 12 June, all local kindergartens/childcare- 
centres and primary schools were closed, initially for 2 weeks, but was subsequently 
extended into the summer holiday; whilst secondary schools were closed individually 
for 2 weeks if any student were confirmed of HSI infection until summer holiday 
commenced on 10 July. On 13 June, 8 public outpatient clinics across Hong Kong were 
converted to designated flu clinics (DFC) for treating ILI patients, and patients who 
sought medical attention for ILI at DFCs and public hospital Accident & Emergency 
(A&E) departments were routinely tested for HSI infection to monitor the spread of 
HSI in the community. On 17 June, reporting criteria for suspected HSI cases was 
revised slightly (Appendix 2). From 27 June onwards, in view of HSI infection 
appeared to be milder than previously expected, the Department of Health announced 
the gradual downgrading of mitigation measures to reduce inconvenience caused to the 
public (Centre for Health Protection, 2009c). On 27 June, reporting criteria was revised 
to focus on severe cases (Appendix 3). On 29 June, hospitalisation of confirmed cases 
(for isolation purposes) was adjusted to hospitalise only by medical need. On 20 July, 
the Education Bureau announced that school season for the next academic year may 
commenced as scheduled and adjusted the school closure policy to apply reactive 
closure of 1 week for all types of schools should an outbreak were detected. On 17 
August, DFCs resumed services for chronic disease patients. On 25 September, in light 
of HSI had dominated the majority of influenza cases which made laboratory 
surveillance no longer useful, the Department of Health declared laboratory testing for 
HSI infection at DFCs and public hospital A&E departments would only be offered to 




End of first wave & Vaccine arrival 
 From 29 September onwards, HSI activities in Hong Kong was monitored through 
CHP‟s influenza surveillance system, which monitors local influenza activities both  
clinically and virologically. For clinical surveillance, CHP collates on a weekly basis 
the number of ILI cases identified at sentinel surveillance sites (which include General 
Out-patient Clinics (GOPC), General Practitioners (GP)). For virological surveillance, 
CHP subtypes influenza samples collected from sentinel hospitals and laboratories to 
determine the type and subtype of influenza virus that is currently circulating. Figure 
1.4 on the next page shows the clinical and virological influenza surveillance data 
collected by CHP during 2009–2010. The data shows the first wave of Pandemic 
(H1N1) 2009 in Hong Kong peaked at the end of September and subsided during 
October-November, with no further pandemic peak emerged thereafter. By the end of 
2009, pandemic vaccine arrived Hong Kong and was available for public 
administration from 21 December onwards, though the vaccination rate was low partly 
due to the fear of developing Guillain-Barré syndrome after receiving the vaccine. 
 
1.4.3 Study opportunity  
 From 1 May to 27 September 2009, community-wide laboratory surveillance on 
HSI was active in Hong Kong until the Department of Health adjusted laboratory 
testing criteria for HSI infection at DFCs and public hospital A&E departments on 28 
September (this period shall be referred as the „enhanced surveillance period‟ hereafter). 
Surveillance data collected during the enhance surveillance period, together with the 
temporal changes in school session caused by school closure and summer holiday 
(details described in section 1.5.2), provided an ideal opportunity for investigating the 
effect of school closure in reducing Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 transmission. A 
diagrammatic summary on the public health actions implemented for Pandemic (H1N1) 
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2009 and the temporal changes in school session during the enhanced surveillance 
period in Hong Kong is given in Figure 1.5 on the next page. 
 
  (a) 
 
 
   (b) 
 
Figure 1.4  CHP influenza surveillance data collected during 2009-2010.  
(a) Weekly ILI consultation rate amongst sentinel general practitioners. (Adapted from Centre 
for Health Protection (2010)). (b) Monthly influenza virus isolation rates by type and subtype. 































Containment (1 May - 29 Jun) 
Mitigation (10 Jun onwards) 
S1: Emergency response level activated (1 May) 
C1: School closure policy started (12 Jun) 
S2: Designated Flu Clinics activated (13 Jun) 
S3: Reporting criteria revised (17 Jun) 
S4: Reporting criteria revised to reporting severe cases only (27 Jun)  
C2: Summer Holiday started (10 Jul) 
C3: Education Bureau announced 2009/10 school year to start as scheduled & revised school closure policy (20 Jul) 
C4: New school season started for primary and secondary schools (1 Sep) 
S5: Criteria for laboratory testing at Designated Flu Clinics revised (28 Sep) 
 






C2 C3 C4 
Normal school session      School session with reactive closure       School session resumed in some schools (with reactive closure)  
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1.5 Data and Research Objective 
1.5.1 Research Objective 
 The objective of the present thesis is to analyse the HSI surveillance data collected 
from May through September 2009 to investigate the effect of school closure in 
reducing Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 transmission in Hong Kong. Given that past seasonal 
and pandemic influenza studies reveal that school closure is not necessarily effective in 
reducing influenza transmission and this intervention incurs substantial social and 
economic costs to the public, the mitigative effect of school closure on Pandemic 
(H1N1) 2009 transmission in Hong Kong should be investigated to inform future 
influenza pandemic planning. Although it has been reported by Wu et al. (2010a) that 
Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 transmission in Hong Kong was reduced by 25% when 
summer holiday commenced, the study arrived to its conclusion by analysing 
surveillance data collected as of 27 August 2009 and data collected in September was 
subsequently not analysed. As highlighted by authors in Wu et al. (2010a) that the 
impact of school closure on HSI transmission was difficult to determine precisely since 
school closure was implemented early in Hong Kong which made data on 
transmissibility of the HSI virus in absence of school closure unavailable, I believe it is 
worthwhile to re-analyse the data to include surveillance data collected in September – 
data that would reflect the HSI virus's transmissibility under normal school season – to 
develop a better understanding on the impact of school closure on HSI transmission in 
Hong Kong. And my analysis in the latter chapters will show that, by including 
surveillance data collected in September, more about HSI transmission during school 
closure was understood, which subsequently led to a slightly different conclusion about 





1.5.2 Data for this research 
E-flu data 
 Demographics of laboratory-confirmed HSI cases were recorded in CHP‟s e-flu 
information system. For each case, the patient‟s age, gender, residential address, 
symptom-onset date, confirmation date, hospitalisation date and vital status were 
recorded. A dataset containing the age, gender, residential address and confirmation 
date of the cases confirmed from May through September 2009 was obtained from CHP 
for analysis. These cases represent: 
1. Patients with mild ILI symptoms who sought medical attention at public and 
private healthcare sectors from 25 April to 27 June 2009 and at DFCs and public 
hospitals A&E departments from 13 June to 27 September 2009. 
2. Patients with severe ILI symptoms that include fever ( 38oC), pneumonia or 
other related complication who sought medical attention at local healthcare 
facilities from 25 April to 27 September 2009. 
 
 For ease of reference, this dataset shall be referred as the „e-flu dataset‟ or „e-flu 
data‟ hereafter in this thesis. 
 
School session of kindergarten, primary and secondary schools 
 All local kindergartens/childcare-centres (referred together as „kindergartens‟ 
hereafter), primary schools and secondary schools were involved in school closure for 
Pandemic (H1N1) 2009. The bottom of Figure 1.5 on page 23 shows school session of 
each school type during the enhanced surveillance period. Since school closure policy 
was activated after identification of the first non-imported case on 10 June, all 3 types 
of schools were in session from 1 May until then. Afterwards, their sessions differ due 




 All kindergartens were closed from 12 June through 20 July due to school closure 
(until 20 July since that was the date the Education Bureau revised the school closure 
policy and announced schools may resume session in the following academic year as 
scheduled). From 21 July onwards, since most kindergartens in Hong Kong have their 
own school schedule, the date which kindergartens resumed session is not known (it is 
known that not all kindergartens recess during summer and the Education Bureau has 
no information on their schedule since they are mostly privately operated (personal 
communication with the Education Bureau)). All kindergartens would have resumed 
session by 1 September since that is the start date of the academic year in Hong Kong. 
Under the revised school closure policy, kindergartens that had resumed session were 
subjected to individual closure of 1 week if an outbreak had occurred amongst their 
students. 
Primary schools 
 All primary schools were closed from 12 June though 31 August due to school 
closure and summer holiday. After school session resumed on 1 September, they were 
subjected to the same closure policy for kindergartens (i.e. they were individually 
closed for 1 week if an outbreak had occurred amongst their students). 
 
Secondary schools 
 All secondary schools were in session from 12 June through 9 July but were 
subjected to individual closure of 2 weeks if any student were confirmed of HSI 
infection. Summer holiday commenced on 10 July and ended on 1 September. After 
school session resumed in September, secondary schools were subjected to the same 




Data on individual school closure 
 The name of individually closed kindergartens, primary schools and secondary 
schools and the corresponding closure start date is available from CHP‟s “Human 
Swine Influenza Press Releases” website (Centre for Health Protection, 2009d) and is 
listed in the Appendix section of this thesis (Appendix 5 for kindergartens, Appendix 6 
for primary schools and Appendix 7 for secondary schools). Table 1.3 gives statistics 
on the number of kindergartens, primary schools and secondary schools that were 
reactively closed.  
 
  
Table 1.3  Statistics on individually closed kindergartens, primary schools and secondary schools. 
 Kindergarten Primary school Secondary school 
Number of schools individually  
closed at least once 
3 19 68 
Number of local schools in  
2009/10 academic year§ 
872 540 498 
Percentage of schools individually 
closed at least once 
0.4% 3.5% 13.7% 
§




1.5.3 Soundness of using e-flu data as reflection of the actual epidemic 
 Evaluating the effect of school closure in reducing HSI transmission in Hong 
Kong from e-flu data assumes that the data provides a good reflection on the actual 
epidemic. For this assumption to be sound, the infection-to-confirmation delay of the 
surveillance mechanism should be small and the public‟s health-seeking behaviour for 
HSI should remain relatively unchanged over the surveillance period. Regarding the 
infection-to-confirmation delay of the surveillance mechanism, Figure 1.6 shows the 
empirical distribution of the delay from symptom-onset to confirmation in days for 
4,777 cases recorded in e-flu data (not all cases provided a symptom-onset date). It can 
be observed that most cases had a delay of 2-3 days, and the majority cases were 
confirmed within 5 days after symptom-onset. This confirmation delay, together with 
the incubation period of influenza (which is roughly 1-2 days), imply that the epidemic 
captured in e-flu data lags roughly 3-5 days behind the actual epidemic. Since this delay 
is small compared to the duration of school closure and summer holiday (which are on 
the order of months), any changes in HSI incidence associated with school closure 
should be discernible and should occur near the time of closure when displayed 
graphically. 
 
Figure 1.6  Empirical distribution of the delay from symptom-onset to infection confirmation in 
days for 4,777 cases in the e-flu database as of 27 August, 2009. (Captured from Wu et al. (2010a)).  
 29 
 
 Regarding the public‟s health-seeking behaviour for HSI during the surveillance 
period, 2 studies by Cowling and colleagues suggest that it stayed relatively constant 
after mitigation phase began. In the first study, Cowling et al. (2010b) investigated the 
community psychological and behavioural response of the Hong Kong public during 
the first wave of Pandemic (H1N1) 2009, and data from the study is shown in Figure 
1.7. It can be observed that, after identification of the first non-imported case on 10 
June (start of mitigation phase), indicators of the public‟s psychological response to 
HSI (such as “worry if developed ILI”, “perceived severity compared to SARS”) did 
not change significantly throughout the first wave of the pandemic. In the second study, 
Cowling et al. (2010a) provided data on the cumulative proportion of hospitalised HSI 
cases in Hong Kong from 29 June through October and it is shown in Figure 1.8. Again, 
it can be observed that the proportion of hospitalised HSI cases did not alter 
significantly throughout the period. These data suggest that the Hong Kong public‟s 
health-seeking behaviour for HSI remained relatively constant through the study period 
(10 June – 27 September). Hence e-flu data is likely to give a good reflection on the 
actual HSI epidemic in Hong Kong. 
 
 
Figure 1.7  Community psychological response to HSI over the first wave of the HSI pandemic 
(May through November) in Hong Kong . (Adapted from Cowling et al. (2010b)). 
The red vertical line marks the day the first local case was identified, which triggered activation of the 





Figure 1.8  Cumulative proportion of hospitalised HSI cases (solid line) with 95% Confidence 
Interval (dotted line) from 29 June through October, 2009. (Captured from Cowling et al. (2010a)). 
Data prior 29 June was neglected since all cases identified before this date were hospitalised for isolation. 
It can be observed that the hospitalisation rate increased slightly (to 18%) after laboratory testing criteria 
was changed on 27 September. 
 
 
1.5.4 Layout of this thesis 
 This chapter has explained the background information and objectives of this 
research. The organisation of the rest of this thesis is as follows: Chapter 2 shall 
describe the e-flu dataset by giving its statistics and use the data to construct epidemic 
curves to visualise the mitigative effect of school closure. Chapter 3 shall evaluate the 
effect of school closure by mathematical modelling. Chapter 4 shall discuss the findings 




Chapter 2  
Descriptive and Exploratory Analysis of Surveillance Data 
 
2.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, I will perform 2 analyses to the HSI patient demographics data 
obtained from CHP (e-flu data). First, I will describe the data by giving its statistics. 
Second, I will draw age-and-region-specific epidemic curves to visualise the mitigative 
effect of school closure. For the second analysis, I reason that if school closure were 
effective in mitigating HSI transmission, it is possible that the effect would manifest in 
the epidemic curves as unusual observations (such as a decline in trend) coinciding with 
the time when school closure commenced, suggesting this intervention was indeed 
effective. In the analysis, I decided to examine the effect of school closure from 
age-and-region-specific epidemic curves since I believe the mitigative effect of school 
closure, if present, would intuitively be most noticeable in school-aged children; and I 
postulate that, since some schools were reactively closed, the mitigative effect from 
reactive school closure would only be visible in regional epidemic curves. 
 
In this introduction, I shall first give details of the schooling ages students in Hong 
Kong and their geographic school travel pattern to explain my choice on the age 
boundaries and spatial units used in epidemic curve construction. I will then list the set 
of age-and-region-specific epidemic curves to be constructed and discuss where 
unusual observations may be observed in the epidemic curves if school closure were 




2.1.1 The schooling ages of students in Hong Kong  
The structure of the Hong Kong education system follows the British system and 
is comprised of 3 years of kindergarten education (K1-K3), 6 years of primary 
education (P1-P6), 7 years of secondary education (S1-S7) and 3 years of university 
education (U1-U3). Kindergarten education is not required but it is known that almost 
all children are enrolled. All children are required to go through P1-S3 as those 9 years 
of education are compulsory. Afterwards, roughly 70% S3 graduates will continue 
education for the next 2 years until the arrival of the Hong Kong Certificate Education 
Examination (HKCEE) at the end of S5, which selects roughly 38% of S5 students into 
S6 (Education Bureau, 2010b). At the end of S7, another public examination – the 
Hong Kong Advanced Level Examination (HKALE) – selects 30% of S7 students into 
university education (Education Bureau, 2010b). For S5 and S7 graduates who failed to 
secure a place in S6 or U1, it is known that some students will repeat the final year of 
education and re-take examination in the following year, while others may enrol in 
other education programs or may begin to work. Currently, the Hong Kong education 
system is undergoing a transition to a new structure which comprises of 6 years of 
secondary education (S1-S6) and 4 years of university education (U1-U4), but those 
changes are unrelated to this study as they took place after Pandemic (H1N1) 2009. 
 
Under the traditional structure, children enter K1 at age 2-3, P1 at age 5-6, S1 at 
age 11-12 and U1 at age 18-19. In this analysis, for simplicity, I shall neglect the 
dropout rate of the education system and regard all HSI patients in the age of 0-5, 6-12, 
and 13-19 as students of kindergartens, primary schools and secondary schools, 
respectively. Although this may have over-simplified the actual situation, I believe this 




2.1.2 Geographic school travel pattern of local school students 
For administrative purposes, the area of Hong Kong is divided into 18 District 
Council Districts (hereafter district) (Figure 2.1) and it is known from population 
census data that the majority of full-time students (that includes kindergarten, primary, 
secondary and university students) attend school located within their residential district. 
In Hong Kong, the Census and Statistics Department conducts a Population Census and 
a Population By-Census at the start and at the middle of every decade respectively to 
collect demographic data from the local population. The collected data is then compiled 
and published in geographic aggregated format. From the Hong Kong 2006 Population 
By-census (the closest population census to Pandemic (H1N1) 2009), the number of 
full-time students who reside in one district and attend school in another district is 
available in a matrix named “Place of Study (District Council District)”, and Figure 2.2 
is a heat map representation of the data. The forward diagonal on the heat map, which 
represents students attending school within their residential district, has a darker colour 
than other slots in the heat map, indicating that the majority of students attend school 
located within their residential district.  
 
It is with this knowledge in mind that I speculate individual school closure would 
exert a mitigative effect within the district where the closed school is located. The 
resultant reduction in HSI incidence, if any, would be shadowed by incidences from 
other districts if it was evaluated from the epidemic curve constructed for the whole of 
Hong Kong. I therefore decided to evaluate the effect of individual school closure from 
district-level epidemic curves, which shall be constructed by aggregating confirmed 





Central & Western A Wong Tai Sin H Yuen Long M 
Wan Chai B Kwun Tong J North N 
Eastern C Yau Tsim Mong E Tai Po P 
Southern D Kwai Tsing S Sha Tin R 
Sham Shui Po F Tsuen Wan K Sai Kung Q 
Kowloon City G Tuen Mun L Islands T 




Figure 2.2  Heat map representation of the “Place of study (District Council District)” matrix  
from the Hong Kong 2006 Population By-census  
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2.1.3 Epidemic curves for visualising the effect of school closure 
 The choice of epidemic curves to be constructed for visualising the effect of school 
closure depends on the implementation details of school closure during the pandemic. 
Since kindergartens, primary schools and secondary schools were closed differently, in 
the analysis, I shall construct separate epidemic curves for students of each school type. 
Furthermore, for each type of school student, I shall construct epidemic curves 
geographically resolved at the city-level (the whole of Hong Kong) and at the 
district-level. City-level epidemic curves shall be used to visualise the effect of 
proactive school closure (of kindergartens and primary schools) and summer holiday on 
the epidemic curves. District-level epidemic curves shall be used to visualise the effect 
of individual school closure on the epidemic curves when secondary schools were 
reactively closed prior to the start of summer holiday and when all 3 types of schools 
were reactively closed in the new school season.  
 
 If school closure were effective in mitigating HSI transmission, it may possible 
that the epidemic curves would manifest the following observations: First, at the 
city-level, the epidemic curve of secondary school students may show a decline in 
growth when secondary schools commenced summer holiday on 10 July (the epidemic 
curve of kindergarten and primary schools students are not expected to show any 
unusual observation when their schools began closure on 12 June since local 
transmission of HSI in Hong Kong had only just commenced). Second, at the 
district-level, the epidemic curve of students in each school type may show a decline 




 This section discusses the set of descriptive statistics to be computed from e-flu 
data and outlines the epidemic curves construction procedures. Before doing so, it is 
necessary to discuss some brief statistics of the e-flu dataset and the geo-processing 
details of the data. 
 
Brief statistics and geo-processing of e-flu data 
 The e-flu dataset received from CHP contained the age, gender, confirmation date 
and residential address of 27,687 HSI cases confirmed from 1 May to 30 September, 
2009. The age, gender and confirmation date were recorded in all cases, and 24,417 
cases (88.2%) provided a locatable residential address. For cases without a locatable 
residential address, they could not be involved in the computation of spatially-related 
statistics nor in district-level epidemic curves construction. Hence, spatially-unrelated 
statistics and city-level epidemic curves were computed using the full dataset, whilst 
spatially-related statistics and district-level epidemic curves were computed using only 
cases with residential address recorded. 
 
 The 18 districts of Hong Kong is chosen as the spatial unit for computing 
spatial-statistics and for epidemic curve construction. To determine the residential 
district of cases from their residential address, their residential address was first 
converted to geographic coordinates of the Hong Kong 1980 Grid system, the 
coordinate obtained was then intersected with the 2003 District Council Electoral 





2.2.1 Descriptive statistics of patient demographic data 
The following statistics were computed to describe the e-flu dataset:  
1) Number of cases confirmed and cases with missing residential address by month 
2) Number of male and female HSI cases confirmed by month 
3) Number of cases by quinquennial age groups and the age-specific attack rates 
4) Number of cases by quinquennial age groups across Period 1-4 (see Figure 2.3) 
5) Number of cases by district and the district-specific attack rates 
 
 Figure 2.3 shows the definition of Period 1-4, which were deliberately chosen to 
match periods with different levels of school session. The characteristics of each period 








 To compute age-specific and district-specific HSI attack rates, data on the size of 
the Hong Kong population in 2009 by quinquennial age groups and by district were 
obtained from “Projections of Population Distribution 2009-2018” published by the 
Planning Department of the Hong Kong Government (Planning Department, 2009).  
Figure 2.3  Time periods chosen for temporal grouping of HSI cases. 
Period 1: Before local transmission had begun, patient demographic data mostly from imported cases. 
Period 2: After local transmission had begun, all kindergarten and primary schools were closed, secondary 
schools were closed on an individual reactive basis. Period 3: Summer holiday for all 3 types of school, but 
it is known that some kindergartens in Hong Kong do not have summer holiday for the benefit of working 
parents. Period 4: New school season for all 3 types of schools, all school types were subjected to 
individual, reactive closure if outbreak was detected. 
 














Period 1: imported cases 
( 1 May – 11 Jun) 
 
Period 2: School closure 
(12 Jun – Jul 10) 
 
Period 3: Summer holiday 
(11 Jul – 31 Aug) 
 
Period 4: New school season 




2.2.2 Epidemic Curve Construction 
To construct HSI epidemic curves for school students and other socio-economic 
age groups, I defined the following 5 age classes: Kindergarten students, Primary 
school students, Secondary school students, Adults and Retirees. The age boundary of 
each age class is listed in Table 2.1.  
 
Table 2.1  Age range of the 5 socio-economic age classes defined in this study 
Socio-economic class Age range 
Kindergarten students 0-5 
Primary school students 6-12 




City-level epidemic curves from May through September 2009 were constructed 
by plotting the number of confirmed cases in each age class per day. Similarly, 
district-level epidemic curves were constructed by plotting for each district the number 
of confirmed cases residing in the district in each age class per day. In city-level 
epidemic curves, changes in school session (school season, proactive school closure, 
summer holiday) was indicated by the background colour. In district-level epidemic 
curves, the date when a local school was reactively closed was marked by a vertical 
dash line. The set of reactively closed kindergartens, primary schools and secondary 
schools and their corresponding closure start date are listed in Appendix 5, Appendix 6, 
Appendix 7, respectively. At the city-level, I constructed another graph – Proportion of 
cases in the 5 age classes confirmed per day – to visualise changes in proportion of 




 To quantitatively evaluate whether reactive school closure consistently caused the 
trend of district-level epidemic curves to decline, I classified each episode of reactive 
school closure as a „positive‟, „negative‟ or „uncertain‟ observation in regard to the 
hypothesis and counted the occurrence of each observation type. An episode of reactive 
school closure was classified as a „positive observation‟ if the trend of the epidemic 
curve in the week before and the week after closure were both identifiable and the trend 
of the epidemic curve after closure was clearly lower than that before closure. Similarly, 
an episode of reactive school closure was classified as a „negative observation‟ if the 
trend of the epidemic curve in the week before and the week after closure were both 
identifiable and the trend of the epidemic curve after closure was not lower than that 
before closure. Lastly, an episode of reactive school closure was classified as an 
„uncertain observation‟ if the trend of the epidemic curve in the week before or the 
week after closure was unidentifiable. Figure 2.4 provides a diagrammatic illustration 
of the definition of 'positive‟, „negative‟ and „uncertain‟ observation. 
 
  
Figure 2.4  Definition of „positive‟, „negative‟ and „uncertain‟ observation for classifying the 
effect of reactive school closure. 
 
Positive 
Trend of epidemic curve in the week before 
and after closure both identifiable 
Epidemic curve shows a decline in trend 
after school closure 
 
Closure start date 
Uncertain 
1 week before           1 week after 
Trend of epidemic curve in the week before 
and after closure not identifiable 
Negative  
Trend of epidemic curve in the week before 
and after closure both identifiable  
Epidemic curve shows no decline in trend 





2.3.1 Descriptive statistics of patient demographic data 
1) Number of cases confirmed and cases with missing residential address by month 
Table 2.2 shows the number of HSI cases confirmed and the number of cases with 
missing residential address by month. The majority of the cases (58%) were confirmed 
in September. The percentage of case with missing residential address increased with 
time. 
 
Table 2.2  Number of confirmed HSI cases and cases with missing residential address by month 
 
May June July August September Total 
Number of HSI cases 19 720 2723 8135 16090 27687 
Number of HSI cases with 
missing residential address 
0 0 0 598 2672 3270 
Percentage of HSI cases with 
missing residential address 
0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 7.4% 16.6% 11.8% 
 
2) Number of male and female HSI cases confirmed by month 
 Table 2.3 shows the number of male and female HSI cases confirmed by month. 
Once local HSI transmission began in June, the case ratio between male and female 
stayed fairly closed to 1. 
 
Table 2.3  Number of male and female HSI cases confirmed by month 
Gender May Jun Jul Aug Sep Total 
Male 7 384 1373 4206 8403 14373 
Female 12 336 1350 3929 7687 13314 
Male : Female ratio 0.58 1.14 1.02 1.07 1.09 1.08 
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3) Age distribution of cases and the age-specific attack rate 
Table 2.4 and Figure 2.5 show the size of the Hong Kong population in 2009 and 
HSI cases confirmed as of 30 September 2009 stratified by quinquennial age groups, 
and the corresponding age-specific attack rate per 100,000 population. In Figure 2.5c, it 
can be observed that the attack rate skews towards the younger age groups, with the 
highest attack rate observed in age group 5-9. If individuals aged 0-19 are regarded as 
children/teenagers and aged 20+ are regarded as adults, their HSI attack rate would be 
1416.7 and 158.0 per 100,000 population, respectively, implying that HSI attack rate in 
children/teenagers is roughly 8 times higher compared to that in adults. 
 
 
Table 2.4  Age distribution of the Hong Kong population in 2009, age distribution 
HSI cases as of September 2009 and the corresponding age-specific attack rates per 
100,000 population.  
Age group Population size 
Number of HSI cases 
(as of Sep 2009) 
HSI Attack rate 
(per 100,000 population) 
0-4 233200 3116 1336.2 
5-9 271000 5379 1984.9 
10-14 378100 6267 1657.5 
15-19 434500 3893 896.0 
20-24 488600 2576 527.2 
25-29 545300 1550 284.2 
30-34 544100 903 166.0 
35-39 563000 927 164.7 
40-44 586400 811 138.3 
45-49 668300 741 110.9 
50-54 614100 691 112.5 
55-59 483800 429 88.7 
60+ 1222300 404 33.1 







Figure 2.5  (a) Age distribution of the projected 2009 Hong Kong population ; (b) Age distribution 























































































4) Number of cases stratified by age groups across Period 1-4 
Table 2.5 and Figure 2.6 show the number of HSI cases stratified by age groups 
across Period 1-4. In Figure 2.6, it can be observed the kurtosis of the distributions vary 
amongst the periods. In particular, kurtosis in Period 3 (summer holiday) appears flatter 
than that in Period 2 (school closure) and Period 4 (new school season). 
 
Table 2.5.  Number of confirmed HSI cases stratified by age groups and time periods.  
 Period 1:  
imported cases 
(May 1 – Jun 11) 
Period 2:  
school closure  
(Jun 12 – Jul 10) 
Period 3:  
summer holiday 
(Jul 11 – Aug 31) 
Period 4:  
new school season 
(Sep 1 – Sep 30) 
0-4 3 (5.8%) 39 (3.7%) 1104 (10.5%) 1970 (12.2%) 
5-9 2 (3.8%) 73 (6.9%) 1420 (13.5%) 3884 (24.1%) 
10-14 0 (0.0%) 275 (26.0%) 1453 (13.9%) 4539 (28.2%) 
15-19 20 (38.5%) 261 (24.7%) 1710 (16.3%) 1902 (11.8%) 
20-24 15 (28.8%) 124 (11.7%) 1632 (15.6%) 805 (5.0%) 
25-29 4 (7.7%) 69 (6.5%) 844 (8.0%) 633 (3.9%) 
30-34 2 (3.8%) 40 (3.8%) 451 (4.3%) 410 (2.5%) 
35-39 1 (1.9%) 51 (4.8%) 416 (4.0%) 459 (2.9%) 
40-44 2 (3.8%) 35 (3.3%) 363 (3.5%) 411 (2.6%) 
45-49 0 (0.0%) 44 (4.2%) 343 (3.3%) 354 (2.2%) 
50-54 1 (1.9%) 24 (2.3%) 352 (3.4%) 314 (2.0%) 
55-59 2 (3.8%) 14 (1.3%) 218 (2.1%) 195 (1.2%) 
60+ 0 (0.0%) 7 (0.7%) 183 (1.7%) 214 (1.3%) 






























) Age distribution of HSI cases in 
























Age distribution of HSI cases in  
























Age distribution of HSI cases  
























Age distribution of HSI cases  







5) Number of cases by district stand the district-specific attack rate 
 Table 2.6 and Figure 2.7 show the district population size in 2009 and the number 
of HSI cases confirmed by district as of 30 September 2009, and the corresponding 
district-specific attack rate per 100,000 population. In Figure 2.7c, differences in HSI 
attack rate are observed amongst the districts. The HSI attack rate is highest in district E 
(Yau Tsim Mong) and is lowest in district S (Kwai Tsing), and the difference between 
the 2 attack rates is roughly 2.6 times of the attack rate of district S. 
 
Table 2.6  Projected district population size in 2009, number of HSI cases confirmed for each 






Number of HSI cases 
(as of Sep 2009) 
HSI Attack rate  
(per 100,000 population) 
Central & Western A 263900 1273 482.4 
Wan Chai B 162100 587 362.1 
Eastern C 595800 2184 366.6 
Southern D 281200 1166 414.7 
Sham Shui Po F 372800 1114 298.8 
Kowloon City G 368000 1471 399.7 
Wong Tai Sin H 420900 1548 367.8 
Kwun Tong J 597500 1471 246.2 
Yau Tsim Mong E 304300 1808 594.2 
Kwai Tsing S 517200 856 165.5 
Tsuen Wan K 296700 1696 571.6 
Tuen Mun L 501100 1816 362.4 
Yuen Long M 555800 951 171.1 
North N 309200 915 295.9 
Tai Po P 292000 1561 534.6 
Sha Tin R 616700 1993 323.2 
Sai Kung Q 421700 1619 383.9 
Islands T 155800 385 247.1 
Missing ? n/a 3270 n/a 








Figure 2.7  (a) District population size in 2009 ; (b) District distribution of HSI cases as of 
September 2009 ; (c) District-specific attack rate and city-level attack rate of HSI as of September 






































































2.3.2 Epidemic curves of HSI in Hong Kong 
City-level epidemic curves 
 City-level epidemic curves of the 5 defined age-groups from May through 
September 2009 are shown overlaid together in Figure 2.8, and individually in Figure 
2.9 and Figure 2.10. All epidemic curves except the one of retirees rose steadily after 
mid-June when the first non-imported case was identified. Fluctuations are observed in 
the epidemic curves but general trends can be identified. 
 
An interesting observation can be made in Figure 2.8. It can be observe that, 
throughout the summer holiday, the epidemic curve of adults is above the epidemic 
curves of the other age groups, indicating the majority of HSI cases were in the age 
range of adults during this period (this is expected since 81% of the population are 
adults). Shortly before the start of the new school season on 1 September, the epidemic 
curve of adults stopped rising and began to decline, and the epidemic curve of primary 
and secondary school students began to rise rapidly once entered September and 
became the dominant age group of HSI cases. Figure 2.9b and Figure 2.9c shows the 
epidemic curve of primary school students and secondary school students individually. 
In both epidemic curves, a sudden upsurge in HSI incidence in September can be 
observed. This observation is particularly evident in the epidemic curve of primary 
school students. 
 
Figure 2.9c shows the epidemic curve of secondary school students. As mentioned 
earlier, I postulate that if school closure were effective in reducing HSI transmission, 
the epidemic curve should show a decline in growth when summer holiday commenced 
on 10 July. However, this is not observed in the epidemic curve. In fact, the epidemic 





Figure 2.9a shows the city-level epidemic curve of kindergarten students. The 
vertical dashed line indicates the date the earliest date kindergartens could resume 
session. The epidemic curve appears to grow steadily, though the date which this steady 
growth started is difficult to determine from the diagram. Since kindergartens do not 
begin their new school season on 1 September, no conclusion can be drawn about the 
association between observed rise and the resumption of kindergarten school session. 
 
 Figure 2.11 shows the proportion of HSI cases in the 5 socio-economic age groups 
per day from May through September 2009. Most observed features in the diagram are 
similar to those observed in Figure 2.8 (such as domination of adult cases throughout 
summer, etc). One observed feature in the diagram that was not been noticed in Figure 
2.8 is the decline in the proportion of cases in secondary school students before the start 
summer holiday (June through 10 July). It can be observed that secondary school 
students was initially one of the age class most affected by HSI, but the proportion of 








Figure 2.8  City-level age-specific HSI epidemic curves of from 1 May to 27 September 2009 in Hong Kong.  
Kindergarten students (green), Primary school students (orange), Secondary school students (red), Adults (blue), Retirees (purple). Background colours indicate 










Figure 2.9  City-level HSI epidemic curve of (a) Kindergarten students; (b) Primary 
school students; (c) Secondary school students from 1 May to 27 September, 2009.  







Figure 2.10  City-level HSI epidemic curve of (a) Adults; (b) Retirees 








Figure 2.11  Proportion of HSI cases in the 5 socio-economic age groups per day from 11 June to 27 September, 2009.  
Kindergarten (green), Primary school students (orange), Secondary school students (red), Adults (blue), Retirees (purple). Background colours indicate 
summer holiday (light blue) and school season (lemon chiffon)  
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District-level epidemic curves 
 District-level HSI epidemic curves of kindergarten students, primary school 
students and secondary school students are shown in Figure 2.12, Figure 2.13 and 
Figure 2.14, respectively, and the number of individual school closures classified as a 
„positive‟, „negative‟, or „uncertain‟ observation are listed on Table 2.7. For all 3 types 
of students, their epidemic curve in each district in general look similar across districts 
(and also resemble the shape of the city-level epidemic curves). Great fluctuations are 
present in the epidemic curves which makes it difficult to identify the trend of the curve 
and subsequently caused 43% of reactive school closure episodes to be classified as 
„uncertain observations‟. In regard to whether reactive school closure would cause the 
trend of the district-level epidemic curve to decline, it can be observed in Table 2.7 that 
the percentage of „positive observation‟ is lower than of „negative observation‟ and 
„uncertain observation‟ in all 3 sets of epidemic curves, indicating that there is no 
consistent observation suggesting that reactive school closure would lead to a decline in 
local district-level epidemic curve.  
 
 
Table 2.7  Number of positive, negative, uncertain observations in the district-level 
epidemic curve of kindergarten, primary and secondary school students.  
 Observation  
 Positive Negative Uncertain  Total
§
 
Kindergarten   0  (0%)   1  (33%)    2  (67%)   3  (100%) 
Primary school    2  (11%)   2  (11%)   14  (78%)  18  (100%) 
Secondary school   14  (21%)  27  (40%)   26  (39%)  67  (100%) 
All   12  (14%)  29  (33%)   38  (43%)  87  (100%) 
§ 
Note the number of reactively closed schools listed here do not match those listed in Table 1.3 since they are counted from 11 Jun to 27 








Figure 2.12  Epidemic curves of kindergarten school students across the 18 districts of Hong Kong from 11 June to 27 September, 2009.  
Grey dashed vertical lines represent the start of closure of a primary school in the district.  







Figure 2.13  Epidemic curves of primary school students across the 18 districts of Hong Kong from 11 June to 27 September, 2009. 
Vertical dashed lines represent the start of closure of a primary school in the district. If more than 1 school was closed on the same date, the number of school which 







Figure 2.14 Epidemic curve of secondary school students across the 18 districts of Hong Kong from 11 June to 27 September, 2009. 
Vertical dashed lines represent the start of closure of a secondary school in the district. If more than 1 school was closed on the same date, the number of school which 




2.4.1 Interpretation of results 
 In this analysis, I postulated that if school closure were effective in mitigating HSI 
transmission, it may be possible to observe in the epidemic curves the following 2 
events supporting this intervention was effective. First, at the city-level, I postulated 
that the epidemic curve of secondary school students may show a decline in trend after 
secondary schools commenced summer holiday on 10 July. Second, at the district-level, 
I postulated that the epidemic curves of kindergarten, primary and secondary school 
students in a district may show a decline in trend after a local school of the 
corresponding type was reactively closed. In the results, I did not observe the first nor 
the second event, yet I hesitate to jump to conclude that school closure was ineffective 
in mitigating HSI transmission. Rather, I came to realise, after observing the results, 
that my analyses were inconclusive for the following reasons. First, the occurrence of 
the first event is conditioned on the assumption that the city-level epidemic curve of 
secondary school students was on the rise before summer holiday started (i.e. for an 
epidemic curve to show a decline in growth, it must be growing in the first place), yet 
the trend of the secondary school students epidemic curve from prior summer holiday 
was actually relatively flat (Figure 2.9c), hence a decline in growth in the epidemic 
curve would never have happened. Second, having thought through the reason to why 
the first event was not observed, I came to realise that not observing a decline in growth 
in the district-level epidemic curves of secondary school students after a secondary 
school in the district was reactively closed before summer holiday was actually the 
more likely result, since the epidemic was still nascent at that time and more critically 
school closure at that stage was intended to be a proactive and pre-emptive approach to 
transmission mitigation (mind that secondary schools were reactively closed if any 
student were confirmed on infection). Therefore, under such stringent condition, it was 
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more likely that reactive school closure would not lead to a decline in growth in the 
epidemic curve, at least for secondary school students in the early stages of the 
epidemic. 
 
 Rather than observing the postulated events in the epidemic curves, I instead 
unexpectedly observed, in the city-level epidemic curves, a decline in adults cases and 
an upsurge in cases in primary and secondary school students in September (Figure 2.8, 
Figure 2.11). While the cause of the decline in adult cases is not clear, the upsurge in 
primary and secondary school students cases is likely to be – judging from the trend of 
the epidemic curves and the timing of the upsurge – associated with the commencement 
of the new school season. This observation (that HSI incidence in school-aged children 
drastically increased when school resumed session) is unlikely to be the result of a 
change in health-seeking behaviour as it was also observed a age-specific serial 
cross-sectional serologic survey conducted over the first wave of the pandemic in Hong 
Kong (Wu et al., 2010b) (Figure 2.15), and similar results (increase in ILI cases after 
school resumption) were also observed in the UK (Hine, 2010), US (Chao et al., 2010) 
and Mexico (Chowell et al., 2011). The upsurge in HSI cases in school students in 
September suggests that school session facilitated HSI transmission amongst school 
students, and if this hypothesis were true, it also illustrates that the mitigative effect of 
pre-emptive measures (such as social distancing) can only be seen once the measure is 
lifted. Given that school session appears to have increased transmission amongst school 
students, it is likely that school closure early in the pandemic and summer holiday in 
Hong Kong had reduced incidence of HSI in school-aged children.  
 
 The cause of the decline in adult HSI cases in September is unclear. Figure 2.15 
shows it was unlikely to be due to depletion of susceptible as the serologic prevalence 
of HSI in adults (aged 20 or above) was low throughout the first wave of the pandemic. 
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It is possible that this was caused by a decline in the health-seeking behaviour for HSI 
amongst adults, though there‟s no obvious reason supporting that this was the case. One 
potential explanation is that school-aged children were major spreaders of the HSI virus, 
and the resumption of school season in September meant that they were spending more 
time in schools than at home compared to the holiday period which subsequently 
reduced their contacts with adults (and thereby reducing the rate which they infect 
adults). This explanation is supported by social contact frequencies studies, which have 
shown that adult-children contact happens more frequently in school holidays and 




Figure 2.15  Age-specific proportions of individuals with antibodies against HSI from June to 





 My analysis suffers from a number of limitations. First, as mentioned at the 
beginning, it neglected the dropout rate of the education system in epidemic curve 
construction, which would have over-counted HSI cases in kindergarten and secondary 
school students (not primary school students since P1-P6 education are compulsory). 
Second, the association between the upsurge in HSI cases in school-aged children and 
the resumption of school season was not statistically evaluated. An analysis, known as 
interrupted time series analysis (aka intervention analysis (Box and Tiao, 1975)), was 
originally applied to evaluate the association. However, it was later discovered that the 
analysis is not suitable for epidemic curve data since incidence are discrete data 
whereas the analysis was designed for continuous data. Hence, my analysis did not 
provide any statistical evidence indicating whether the upsurge was more likely to be 
due to the resumption of school season or it was only part of the natural growing trend 
of the epidemic curve. Third, in the quantitative evaluation of reactive school closure‟s 
effect on the district-level epidemic curves, the conclusion of the analysis (that there 
was no evidence supporting reactive school closure caused the trend of the district-level 
epidemic curve to decline) was not rigorously tested by hypothesis testing. To perform 
hypothesis testing in the analysis, one may apply a permutation test (details described 
in Box 2.1). The reason why permutation test was not applied in this study was because 
the classification of school closure events as a „positive‟, negative‟ and „uncertain‟ 
observation was done manually and therefore performing a large number of such 
classification (as required by the permutation test) required a long time. Fourth, since 
the HSI epidemic curves were constructed from surveillance data, the magnitude of the 
curve is sensitive to temporal changes in the public‟s health-seeking behaviour for HSI. 
Fifth, since the epidemic curves were constructed using the confirmation date of each 
case and the confirmation delay was not corrected, they suffered from a delay of 
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 The permutation test is a type of statistical significance test for hypothesis testing. The 
general principle of the permutation test is to set up a null hypothesis (H0) and compute the 
distribution of a test statistic under H0 by rearranging the labels on the observed data, the 
probability of the observed result is then computed from the test statistic to decide whether it 
is to reject or to accept H0 according to the selected statistical significance level.  
 In the case of this study, the permutation test proceeds as follows: 
1. Define H0 as “Reactive school closure does not affect the trend of the local district 
epidemic curve” 
2. Compute the distribution of the test statistics – the distribution of positive observation 
under H0 – via a 2 step calculation. First, re-pair district-specific school closure events 
with district-specific epidemic curves to generate all of the 324 possible district-pairs 
(18   18 districts). (i.e. school closure events of district „A‟ shall be re-paired with the 
district-level epidemic curve of all 18 districts, and the same goes to the school closure 
events of the other 17 districts). Second, count the number of positive observations in 
each of the possible district-pairs. 
3. Compute the probability of the observed count of positive observation (p) from the 
distribution of positive observation under H0 obtained above. 
4. Accept H0 if p is greater than the selected significance level, otherwise reject H0 and 
accept the alternative hypothesis (that reactive school closure did affect the trend of the 
local epidemic curve). 
Box 2.1 Permutation test for testing the effect of reactive school closure  
on the trend of district-level epidemic curves by hypothesis testing 
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Chapter 3  
Evaluating the effect of School Closure by Modelling 
 
3.1 Introduction 
In the previous chapter, I gave a qualitative assessment to the effect of school 
closure on HSI transmission. I concluded that school closure was likely to have reduced 
HSI transmission amongst school-aged children, based on the observation that HSI 
cases in primary and secondary school-aged children drastically increased when school 
season resumed in September which suggested school session facilitated transmission 
amongst them. To public health policy makers who are to consider applying school 
closure in future influenza pandemics, such analysis may not be useful for 2 reasons. 
First, although school closure may have reduced HSI transmission amongst 
school-aged children, this does not logically imply that HSI transmission in the overall 
community was reduced as a result of this intervention. Second, since school closure is 
a costly intervention, a quantitative assessment indicating its effectiveness may be 
necessary to justify the decision to implement. 
 
To address these shortcomings, in this chapter, I will apply techniques from 
infectious disease modelling to evaluate the effect of school closure on the overall 
transmission of HSI in Hong Kong. A metric, known as the effective reproductive 
number (Rt), will be applied to quantitatively describe the spread of HSI in Hong Kong 
in presence and absence of school closure to quantitatively assess the effectiveness of 
the intervention. Before I begin the introduction on infectious disease modelling, I 
would like to start this chapter with some „modelling basics‟ to explain the philosophy 
of modelling and the logic which modelling bases on when drawing conclusion about 
the effect of school closure from surveillance data. 
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3.1.1 Modelling Basics 
What is a model? 
 A model is an abstract representation of a system in reality. A system in reality is 
defined as a set of components that work together to produce certain output (Taylor, 
2003). In infectious disease modelling, the system being modelled is the spread of an 
infection in a host population as time evolves. The components of the system are all 
factors that influence the contagion process, which include the characteristics of the 
infection (such as its natural history of infection and its route of transmission), as well 
as the factors that influence the social mixing of the host population (such as their 
geographic distribution and their social contact pattern). The output of the system is any 
data observed from the transmission process, which may be the sero-prevalence of the 
infection after outbreak or, as in our case, the outbreak epidemic curve. 
 
 Furthermore, a model almost always represent a system in reality simplified in 
some way. As most systems in reality are consist of many components which are too 
complex to be modelled in entirety, when constructing models, modellers often have to 
simplify the system by making assumptions about the system and its components (such 
as dropping components that are thought to be less essential, or substituting 
components with simpler approximations). For example, in infectious disease 
modelling, the social mixing of the host population is assumed to behave like the 
mixing of gas molecules, where everyone comes into contact with each other with the 
same probability and at the same frequency. Understandably, when assumptions that 
seem unrealistic are applied, one may begin to doubt the credibility of the model (and 
rightly so). Nonetheless, the philosophy of modelling is – as long as the model gives 
reasonably accurate prediction about the system, it may still be regarded as acceptable 
and useful.   
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What are models for? 
 Models can be used for understanding systems in the real world whose 
components are identified yet it is not exactly clear how they combine to produce 
observed output in the real world. An example would be the annual reoccurrence of 
seasonal influenza epidemics, which the components of the system are known (such as 
decline in population level immunity induced by virus evolution, changes in human 
social contact frequency, etc), but the exact mechanism that leads to the annual rise and 
fall in influenza cases is not clear. By constructing a model and comparing the model‟s 
predicted output against the actual system output, a modeller tests his/her 
understanding of the system. When the predicted output matches closely to the 
observed output in reality, it suggests that the modeller‟s understanding of the system 
matches closely to the actual system in reality. Therefore, modelling serves as a 
platform for understanding complex systems in the real world. 
 
Fitting models to data 
However, model construction is, most of the time, not a straight forward task. 
Often, there will be quantities in the system whose value is difficult to obtain or is not 
obtainable at all if the quantity is unobserved. For example, in infectious disease 
modelling, the reporting ratio, defined as the proportion of infected individuals 
diagnosed out of the true size of the epidemic, is an unobserved quantity since the true 
size of the epidemic is also unobserved. Without the value of these quantities, the model 
is incomplete and hence model output cannot be generated for comparison to real world 
data. One way around this problem is to regard any unknown quantity of the system as 
a model parameter and infer its value from data through statistical inference. This 
approach is analogous to comparing a set of model outputs (generated by different 
parameter values) against the data and selecting for model parameter values that 
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produce output that most resemble the data observed in reality. In other words, the 
model is „fitted‟ to the data. In this situation, the assumptions of the model are strong 
(since the model is now deliberately made to resemble the data), but doing this gives us 
information on the unknown quantities of the system, thus completing the model and 
making it possible for validation (against data that was not used in inference). In 
infectious disease modelling, this „inference approach‟ is almost always employed as 
there are often unknown quantities in the epidemic. However, model validation doesn‟t 
frequently happen due to constraints in data availability. 
 
It is important to note that, although in infectious disease modelling the „inference 
approach‟ is often applied to fit epidemic models to epidemiological data, the „best-fit‟ 
model obtained through statistical inference would not necessarily “fit well” to data. A 
simple illustrative example would be fitting a straight line through data points that 
resemble a curve – the best fit straight line would still give a poor fit to data. By the 
same token, when modelling epidemiological data, say, the epidemic curve of an 
outbreak, if the model does not resemble the epidemic in reality, the best-fit model 
epidemic curve obtained through statistical inference would still fit poorly to the actual 
epidemic curve. Therefore, when a misfit occurs between the best-fit model and the 
data, it implies that the model is inadequate in representing the actual epidemic. In these 
circumstances, to better represent the actual epidemic, the modeller should refine the 
model using his/her knowledge in the epidemic until a model that fits “reasonably well” 
to data is identified. It must be noted that whether a model fits “reasonably well” to data 
is often judged based on one‟s opinion (usually the modeller‟s) – Figure 3.1 on page 66 
shows the model fit of 2 studies from the literature that is regarded as fitting 








Figure 3.1 Examples of models regarded as fitting “reasonably well” to epidemic curve data. 
Figure (a) and (b) captured from Vynnycky et al (2008) and Fraser et al. (2009), respectively. 
Epidemic curve data are represented as bars in figure (a) and as points in figure (b), the best fit models are 
shown by the lines.  
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Using models to draw conclusion from epidemiological data 
  Once an epidemic model that fits “reasonably well” to data is identified, the 
modeller would then regard the model as an adequate representation of the actual 
epidemic in reality and may begin to draw conclusion about the real world epidemic 
based on the model. Hence, in this study, conclusion about the effect of school closure 
in reducing HSI transmission in Hong Kong is drawn by first specifying an epidemic 
model to describe the HSI epidemic in Hong Kong (which the model assumes that 
school closure does affect transmission of the epidemic, but to an unknown extent), 
then fitting the model to e-flu data to identify a model that fits „reasonably well‟ to the 
data. The best-fit model would then be regarded as an adequate representation of the 
actual HSI epidemic in Hong Kong, then conclusion about the effect of school closure 
in reducing HSI transmission in real world would be drawn from the model developed. 
 
 This section has just explained the approach and philosophy of modelling. In the 
following sections, we shall go through details on infectious disease modelling, 




3.1.2 Infectious Diseases Modelling 
 In infectious disease modelling, epidemic models are specified to describe the 
spread of an infectious disease in a population. Over the years, various epidemic 
models have been developed to address different research question, and model 
categories have been established for classification. In order to explain the type of 
epidemic model to be applied in this study, we must first go through some details on 
model classification. 
 
Types of epidemic models 
1) Deterministic epidemic models vs Stochastic epidemic models 
 Epidemic models are divided into 2 types: deterministic models and stochastic 
models. In deterministic epidemic models, the epidemic process is deterministic and 
differential equations are used to specify the model. In contrast, in stochastic epidemic 
models, the epidemic process is stochastic and models are specified using probability 
distributions. While both types of epidemic model attempt to describe the dynamics of 
epidemics in reality, their mathematical detail are very different. In this study, I shall 
apply deterministic epidemic models to describe the spread of the HSI epidemic in 
Hong Kong as they are much simpler than stochastic epidemic models. 
 
2) Transmission dynamic model vs Catalytic model 
 Deterministic epidemic models can be classified as transmission dynamic models 
and catalytic models (Vynnychky and White, 2010). In transmission dynamic models, 
the force of infection (FOI) – defined as the rate which susceptible individuals 
becoming infected per unit time – vary over time, whereas in catalytic models, FOI 
stays constant. Transmission dynamic models are concerned with the dynamics of 
epidemics, whereas catalytic models are concerned with the age distribution at attack of 
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infectious diseases. In this study, I shall apply transmission dynamic models, as 
catalytic models answer questions that are not related to my research question. 
  
3) Population-based model vs Individual-based model 
 Epidemic models can also be classified as population-based models (aka 
compartmental models) and individual-based models. One distinctive difference 
between the 2 types of model is that, in population-based models, the host population is 
stratified into a number of compartments by their status of infection (e.g. susceptible, 
infected, immune) and the number of persons in each compartment need not be integers 
(e.g. it is valid to have 1.1 infected persons). In contrast, in individual-based models, 
individuals of the host population are explicitly represented, and each is given an 
infection status, hence the numbers of persons in each infection status would always be 
integers. In this study, I shall apply population-based models, since individual-based 
models are computationally intensive and are usually for network-based epidemic 
simulations. 
 
 In this study, I shall apply a deterministic, population-based, transmission dynamic, 
age-structured SIR model to describe the transmission dynamics of the HSI epidemic 
from June through September 2009 in Hong Kong. Having explained what 
deterministic, population-based transmission dynamic models are, I shall now discuss 




The Susceptible-Infectious-Recovered model 
 The Susceptible-Infectious-Recovered (SIR) model is one of the simplest models 
for modelling the spread of acute immunising infections in a population (such as 
influenza, ebola, measles). In the SIR model, individuals susceptible to infection start at 
the S state, and move to the I state once contracted infection, and move to the R state 







 In the population-based version of the SIR model, individuals are grouped by their 
status of infection into the S, I and R compartments. The spread of the epidemic in the 
population is modelled as the progression of a self-catalytic reaction in a population of 
gas molecules. Hence the rate which the epidemic spreads in the population is 
approximated by the rate equation in chemistry (Anderson and May, 1991). Precisely, 
the epidemic is simulated by the system of equations: 
 
     
  
        
    
 
 
     
  
       
    
 
         
     
  





S I R 
Figure 3.2 Flow structure of the SIR model 
The rates above the arrows only apply to the population-based SIR model 
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where                denote the size of susceptible, infectious, and recovered 
compartment at time t, respectively;   is the size of the population;   is the effective 
contact rate (an effective contact is a contact that leads to transmission), which specifies 
the per capita rate transmission occurs between 2 specific individuals per unit time; and 
  is the recovery rate, which specifies the rate infectious individuals recover from 
being infectious per unit time. The values of   and   are infection-specific and are 
related to basic reproductive number (R0) and the generation time (Tg) of the infection. 
R0 is a measure of the transmissibility of an infection. It is defined as the average 
number secondary infections generated per primary case in an entirely susceptible 
population (Anderson and May, 1991). Tg measures how quickly an infection is 
transmitted from the primary case to the secondary case. It is defined as the average 
time between successive infections in a chain of transmission (Vynnychky and White, 
2010). Under equations 3.1-3.3, R0 is equal to     and Tg is equal to     , thus one 
can easily calculate   and   from R0 and Tg and vice versa when either information is 
available.  
 
 The equations of the population-based SIR model specifies the rate which the 
epidemic progresses through time. Given R0, Tg, and the number of individuals initially 
in the S state, I state and R state (i.e. value of               ), the epidemic can be 
simulated by solving equation 3.1-3.3. Since equations 3.1-3.3 are non-linear thus 
cannot be solved analytically, numerical integration techniques such as the Euler 
method are required to approximate the solution of the equations. Details on the Euler 
method and an example on simulating an epidemic under the population-based SIR 
model are given in Box 3.1 on page 73. 
 
 It is important to note that several simplifying assumptions (which are not 
necessarily biologically realistic) are implicitly assumed in the population-based SIR 
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model. First, the infection is assumed to be spreading in a population that is closed, 
homogenous and homogenously mixing, where closeness refers to a population with no 
birth, death, immigration and emigration processes occur; population homogeneity 
refers to all individuals are equally susceptible to contracting infection regardless of 
demographics; and mixing homogeneity refers to all individuals having the same 
contact frequency and chance of contacting anyone in the population. Second, the rate 
of transmission is assumed to the product between the effective contact rate   and the 
proportion of susceptible individuals and infectious individuals in the population. (This 
assumption is known as the mass-action principle, since it is similar to the “law of mass 
action” assumption in the rate equation of chemical reactions). Third, the size of the I 
compartment is assumed to declined at a constant rate  , implying that the infectious 
period of infectious individuals in the model and subsequently the Tg of the infection 
are exponentially distributed. This contrasts to reality in that serial interval (the time 
difference between the symptom onset time of the primary case and the secondary case) 
of most infections in reality is observed to have a be unimodal distribution which is 
better approximated by the weibull or gamma distribution (Cowling et al., 2009). 
Fourth, the SIR framework assumes susceptible individuals immediately become 
infectious upon infection. This differs to reality in that infected individuals in reality 
usually undergo an incubation period after infection before becoming infectious. Fifth, 
the effect from other factors that are known to affect transmission (such as seasonal 
factors for influenza, host social contact pattern) are assumed to be non-essential and 






          
   
               
 
 
                      
                     
          
                   
          
                    
                                    
In this extension box, I will explain the principle of Euler method and apply it to 
simulate an epidemic using the populated-based SIR model as an illustrative example. 
Principle of Euler method 
Euler method is a numerical procedure for solving first-order differential equations 
with an initial value. Its principle is analogous to drawing consecutive tangent lines of the 
function starting from the initial value (below diagram). By definition, the first derivate of a 
function is: 
where       is known and      is the function we would like to obtain through integration. 
If we rearrange the above equation, it can be seen that        can be approximated by:  
Therefore, starting from the initial value      , any point on      (let‟s denote it by      ) 
can be approximated recursively by: 
where   is a specified step size to traverse from    to   . Since Euler method is an 
approximation method, the smaller value of  , the more accurate the approximation. 
However, a more accurate approximation comes at a cost of more iterations of calculations. 
                  




                    
                    
         
 
    
                         
     
   
    
                    
Simulating an epidemic using the population-based SIR model 
I now illustrate how Euler method can be applied to the population-based SIR model to 
simulate the spread of an infection in a population. I will assume the infection spreads in a 
population of 100 persons (      ), with 1 person initially infectious and the rest 
susceptible (                      , and the infection has an R0 of 3 and a Tg of 2 
days (thus              ). For simplicity, I will use a time step size of 1 day (    .  
Simulating the epidemic is equivalent to calculating the values of                
from equations 3.1–3.3 for       . I will first illustrate how                can be 
calculated from               . To calculate     , apply Euler method to equation 3.1: 
Similarly,           can be calculated from equation 3.2, 3.3, respectively: 
                    
                    
         
 
            
                        
    
   
           
                  
                    
                           
                               
              
Once                have been calculated,                can be obtained from 




Population-based SIR model with heterogeneous population  
 The homogenous population and homogenous mixing assumptions in the 
population-based SIR model can be relaxed to partition the population into subgroups 
with group-specific mixing (Figure 3.3). When this relaxation is applied to partition the 
population into age groups, it yields an age-structured population-based SIR model. 
The equations of the population-based SIR model with   subgroups are:  
 
      
  
            
     
  
 
   
  
      
  
             
     
  
 
   
           
      
  





where      ,       ,        is the number of susceptible, infectious and recovered 
individuals in subgroup   at time  ;    is the size of the  
   subgroup;   is a      
 
 
Figure 3.3  Population structure of the population-based SIR model 
Left – homogenous population with homogenous mixing 




effective contact rate matrix (formally known as the who-acquire-infection-from-whom 
matrix, or WAIFW matrix for short (pronounced as WAIFA or WAIFU)), which entry 
    is the per capita rate an individual in subgroup   acquires infection from an 
individual in subgroup   per unit time; and   is the recovery rate, which specifies the 
rate infectious individuals in all subgroups recover from being infectious per unit time. 
Similar to the simple population-based SIR model (with no population partition), the 
values of     and   are related to R0, Tg of the infection. However, only the value of   
can be calculated from Tg using the same approach as before, the values of     cannot 
be calculated solely from R0, Tg and are inferred by fitting the model to group-specific 
incidence data. 
 
 As mentioned above, in an SIR model with   subgroups, the WAIFW matrix is 
of      dimension, corresponding to    entries whose values need be inferred 
from group-specific incidence data. In studies which patient‟s age is a risk factor for 
infection, the study population would typically be stratified into 5-7 age groups, 
corresponding to 25-49 parameters to be inferred from data. For such studies, inferring 
    from data is often considered problematic since models with over 20 parameters are 
generally too complex for inference and an enormous amount of data (which would 
typically be beyond the amount of data available) would be required for inference. To 
overcome this problem, it is necessary to make assumptions about the structure of the 
WAIFW matrix to reduce the number of parameters in the model. One commonly 
applied assumption is the social contact hypothesis, which assumes the amount of 
transmission between 2 subgroups is proportional to the contact frequency between the 
subgroups (Wallinga et al., 2006). In other words, the WAIFW matrix is proportional to 
the contact matrix – a matrix that contains the contact frequencies between all subgroup 
pairs. When the social contact hypothesis is assumed, the inference is reduced to 
inferring only the proportionality constant between the WAIFW matrix and contact 
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matrix from group-specific incidence data, provided that contact matrix data are 
available. Recently, contact matrix data between persons in different age groups 
(referred as „age-contact matrix data‟ hereafter) in 8 European countries were published 
in Mossong et al. (2008) (details of Mossong et al. (2008) are outlined in Box 3.2). In 
this study, since no age-contact matrix data has been collected for the Hong Kong 
population, I shall assumed the age-contact pattern in Hong Kong is similar to those 
countries in Mossong et al. (2008) and use data from Mossong et al. (2008) as proxy for 
age-contact matrix data of the Hong Kong population. 
 
 Once the values of the WAIFW matrix are determined, the value of R0 can be 
calculated from the WAIFW matrix through a quantity known as the Next Generation 
Matrix (NGM). The NGM is a matrix of the same dimension to the WAIFW matrix. It is 
derived by multiplying the WAIFA matrix (   ) by the population size of each subgroup 
(  ) and the duration of infectiousness ( ) of the infection (duration of infectiousness is 
the reciprocal of the recovery rate, and is equal to Tg under the SIR model). Precisely, 
the formula of the NGM in a population-based SIR model with   subgroups is: 







             
   








The NGM specifies the number of secondary cases in each subgroup generated by each 
infectious person in each subgroup in an entirely susceptible population. Under this 
heterogeneous spreading model, R0 is the ratio between the number of infectious 
individuals in the current generation and in the next generation, and the value of R0 is 
equal to the leading eigenvalue of the NGM (Diekmann et al., 1990).  





Mossong et al. (2008) studied the contact frequencies between persons in different age 
groups in 8 European countries. In the study, individuals were asked to complete a diary 
documenting details of their physical and non-physical contacts in a day (such as the age of 
contact recipient, the duration of the contact), where a physical contact was defined as 
skin-skin contact, and a non-physical contact was defined as a two-way conversation in the 
presence of the contact recipient. The collected data were then compiled to produce a 
„physical contact matrix‟ and an „all contact matrix‟ for each country, which show the 
average number of physical contacts and “physical and non-physical contacts” between 
persons in quinquennial age groups, respectively. The heat maps below show the „all contact 
matrix‟ of Belgium, Germany and Finland. The colour scale goes from white to yellow to 
green to blue, with white denoting the highest frequency and blue denoting the lowest. 
  
As it can be observed, the age-contact pattern in the 3 countries are similar – with a 
strong diagonal in the middle flanked by 2 smaller diagonals with a weaker colour. The 
strong diagonal in the middle indicates that contact occurs most frequently between persons 
of similar age – a phenomenon known as „assortative mixing‟ in the social sciences. The 2 
weaker diagonals correspond to contacts between parents and children. This contact pattern 
(3 diagonals) was observed in most matrices in the study (for both physical contacts and 
non-physical contacts in all countries), indicating the age-contact pattern and frequencies 
amongst all the study countries were generally similar. 
In this study, since no such age-contact matrix data is available for the Hong Kong 
population, we shall use age-contact matrix data from Mossong et al. (2008) as proxy for that 
of the Hong Kong population in our model. I believe this assumption is acceptable, given that 
the contact pattern in the 8 European countries were generally similar, which indicates that 
the age-contact matrix data of the Hong Kong population is likely to be similar too if it were 
collected. 
Box 3.2 Contact frequencies between persons in different 
age groups in 8 European countries 
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The Effective Reproductive Number 
 R0 is the average number of secondary cases generated per primary case in an 
entirely susceptible population at the start of the epidemic. Once an epidemic has begun, 
the number of susceptible individuals in the population quickly declines, and 
consequently the number of secondary cases generated per primary case would decline 
as the epidemic progresses. Hence, once the epidemic has started, the number of new 
infections per infection generation will be some number less than R0, and this number is 
referred as the effective reproductive number (Rt). The value of Rt is time-specific: it is 
equal to R0 at the start of the epidemic and it declines as the epidemic proceeds. Rt with 
value above 1 implies the epidemic is growing, otherwise, the epidemic is declining. 
 
 The value of Rt in an epidemic model can be calculated once all model parameters 
have been inferred from data. The formula for calculating Rt differs by model. In the 
population-based SIR with no population partitions. Rt is calculated by: 




where    and   are the number of susceptible persons at time   and the size of the 
population, respectively. In the population-based SIR with   subgroups, Rt is 
calculated by replacing in the formula for calculating R0 from NGM (equation 3.8) the 
population sizes of each subgroup (  ) with the number of susceptible persons in each 
subgroup at time   (   ):  
                          











               
   


















3.1.3 Bayesian Inference 
 Statistical inference is the process of drawing conclusion from data whose 
generation process is probabilistic in nature. Traditionally, statistical inference is 
divided into the Frequentist paradigm and the Bayesian paradigm due to differences in 
their interpretation of probability. In the Frequentist paradigm, probability is interpreted 
as “the frequency of occurrence of an outcome in a large number of hypothetically 
repeated trials”. In the Bayesian paradigm, probability is interpreted as “a measure of a 
state of knowledge”, and it is used to describe the degree of belief in propositions such 
as a hypothesis being true or a model parameter equalling to certain value. In this study, 
I adopted the Bayesian paradigm as the framework for statistical inference, therefore 
this section focuses on Bayesian inference. 
 
 Let   denote the set of parameters and   denote the set of data         which 
  is to be inferred from, the procedure of Bayesian inference is as follows: First, the 
inference starts with one by specifying a probability distribution known as the prior 
distribution to describe his/her belief on the value of   before   is observed. Next,   
is incorporated into the probability distribution of   using Bayes‟ theorem: 
 
          
  
    
               (3.11) 
 
where      is the prior distribution of  ,          is the conditional probability of 
observing   given   and is referred as the likelihood function,      is the probability 
of   marginalised over   and is known as the normalising constant, and          is 
the posterior distribution of  , which describes the belief on the value of   after 
observing  . The posterior distribution is the end product of Bayesian inference.  
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  Bayes‟ theorem shows that, evaluating the posterior requires calculating the prior, 
the likelihood and the normalising constant. Whilst the prior and the likelihood function 
can usually be calculated without much difficulty, calculating the normalising constant 
is usually hard. Specifically, the normalising constant      is calculated by integrating 
the joint density of   and    over  . 
                                     (3.12) 
which the integral is a of the same dimension to the dimension of  . Traditionally, the 
inability of calculating      has been an obstacle to Bayesian Inference. Fortunately, 
in the modern era, calculation of      can be avoided when evaluating the posterior 
with the use of Markov Chain Monte Carlo, which will be explained in the next section.  
 
 Since      has no dependence on   which makes it essentially a constant (as its 
name already suggests), Bayes‟ theorem is often written as: 
                        (3.13) 
and this equation is often read as: 
                              
If the data points in   are independent, the posterior distribution calculated from one 
data point and can be used as prior for the next data point. In this situation, Bayes‟ 
theorem can be written as: 
                        
 
   
      (3.14) 
 An illustrative example on using Bayesian inference to infer parameter values 
from data is given in Box 3.3 on page 83.  
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Summarising the posterior 
 Once the inference is complete, a natural step to analysing the posterior 
distribution would be to plot and visualise it. Furthermore, it is common to describe the 
posterior distribution using summary statistics such as point estimation and an interval 
estimation. For point estimation, the posterior mean, mode, and median are commonly 
used. For interval estimation, the 95% credible interval (CI), which is the interval in the 
centre of the posterior distribution that bounds an area containing 95% probability, is 
often used (precisely, 95% CI is the interval [  ,  ] such that             
                   , where   is the probability density function and   is the 
cumulative density function of the posterior distribution). In this study, the posterior 
mean and the 95% credible interval shall be used for summarising the posterior 
distributions of model parameters. 
 
Non-informative Prior 
 Non-informative priors are priors that express vague or no prior information about 
the value of  . In situations where little information is known about the value of  , 
non-informative priors are usually applied to ensure information contained in the 
posterior distribution mostly stem from the likelihood function (i.e. from the data). A 
common choice of non-informative prior, known as the flat prior, is to assign equal 
probability to all values of   (with value 1/(b-a) for           for continuous  , and 
value     for               for discrete  ). When flat priors are used, the prior 
effectively becomes a constant with respect to  , hence the posterior distribution 





                   
        
   
 David tosses a bent coin N times, obtaining    heads and    tails. We assume the 
coin has probability pH coming up heads, and we know pH must lie in the range of [0,1] (by 
the definition of probability). We shall apply Bayesian inference to infer the value of pH from 
data generated from those N tosses. 
 As said in the main text, Bayesian inference begins by specifying a prior probability 
P(pH) to describe the degree of belief over the possible range of values before any data is 
observed. Since we do not know how bent the coin is, a sensible approach to specifying the 
prior would be to apply non-informative (flat) prior for pH, which in this case assigns a 
probability density of 1 to each of its possible value (grey line in the figure). Next, Bayes‟ 
theorem is applied to calculate the posterior probability of pH in light of the data. To apply 
Bayes‟ theorem, one must first identify the likelihood function for the inference. In the case 
of coin tosses, the likelihood function is the binomial distribution, hence the posterior 
distribution P(pH | nH , nT) can be calculated by the following equation: 
                
 




    
        
       
which can be simplified as: 
 As the coin is tossed more times,                changes accordingly to the value of 
   and   . The below figure shows the distribution of                after 0 (grey), 15 
(red) and 273 (blue) tosses. The last result shows    is most likely to be around 0.73 and the 
95% CI of    is [0.68, 0.78]. 
 
Box 3.3 Bayesian Inference: an illustrative example 
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3.1.4 Markov Chain Monte Carlo 
Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) methods are a class of algorithms that can 
be used for evaluating multi-dimensional posterior distributions in Bayesian inference. 
The idea of MCMC to draw samples from the posterior distribution by constructing an 
aperiodic, irreducible and positive recurrent markov chain that has its invariant 
distribution the posterior distribution of interest. Usually, it is not hard to construct a 
markov chain with such property, the difficulty in MCMC is on devising a markov 
chain that mixes rapidly (meaning that it converges to its invariant distribution quickly 
regardless of its starting position) and assessing convergence of the markov chain. Once 
the markov chain has converged, the samples drawn by the markov chain would 
correspond to samples drawn from the posterior distribution (the samples drawn before 
convergence is known as the burnin, and these samples are simply discarded), hence the 
actual posterior distribution can be approximated by computing the kernel density of 
the posterior samples and summaries of the posterior distribution can also be computed 
similarly. Due to the Markovian nature of this technique, MCMC samples are serially 
correlated (hence the posterior samples are also serially correlated). Fortunately, 
ergodic theorem guarantees that summaries computed from MCMC samples are valid 
estimates of summaries of the actual posterior distribution. 
 
The Metropolis-Hastings Algorithm 
 The Metropolis-Hastings algorithm is an MCMC algorithm for drawing correlated 
samples from a probability distribution. The principle of the algorithm is as follows: At 
each iteration of the markov chain, the value of the parameters ( ) is perturbed by a 
proposal distribution (      ) to generate a candidate value of the parameters (  ).    





   
                    
                    
 ( 3.15) 
 
where   is the data;   is the current value of the parameters;    is the candidate value 
of the parameter;        is the probability density function of the posterior distribution 
which we would like to sample from; and        is the probability density function of 
the proposal distribution. If   is greater than 1,    will be accepted, otherwise, a 
random number   will be drawn from the uniform distribution U[0,1], and    will be 
accepted if    . The parameter values at each iteration of the markov chain would 
correspond to the samples drawn from the posterior distribution. The procedure of the 





   
                    
                    
 
 Let   denote the set of parameters;   denote the data;         denote the posterior 
distribution of   given  ;        denote the proposal distribution;       denote the initial 
value of the parameters. To draw   MCMC samples from        , one performs: 
1. Assign       to  . 
2. Calculate the value of          for the current value of  . 
3. Generate a candidate value    based on the current value of   using         . 
4. Calculate the value of          for   . 
5. Calculate the acceptance ratio  : 
6. Accept    if           , where   is a number sampled from             , 
otherwise, retain the values in  . 
7. Record   
8. Repeat step 2-7 for     times, where  is the length of the burnin, and  is the 
number of iterations of MCMC samples desired. 
 
Box 3.4 Procedures of the Metropolis-Hastings Algorithm 
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 When the proposal distribution has a symmetric probability density function (such 
as the uniform distribution or the normal distribution), the value of          and 
         would be equal for all   and hence they cancel out each other in equation 
3.11. In this scenario, the acceptance probability simply becomes: 
   
            
            
 ( 3.16) 
which is the ratio between the posterior probability calculated at the current and 
candidate parameter value. This special case is known as the Metropolis Random Walk.  
 
Acceptance rate 
 In an MCMC run, the acceptance rate is the fraction of candidate parameter values 
accepted out of the total number of iterations. In the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm, the 
acceptance rate of the markov chain is an important indicator to the markov chain‟s 
efficiency in exploring the parameter space and it is sensitive to the variance of the 
proposal distribution. If the acceptance rate is too low (caused by the proposal 
distribution having a high variance), it indicates that the chain rejects most of the 
proposed parameter values and is not exploring the parameter space efficiently enough 
since it stays put at the current parameter value for a very long time. On the other hand, 
if the acceptance rate is too high (caused by the proposal distribution having a low 
variance), it indicates that the chain takes small steps around the parameter space and 
hence it is not exploring the parameter space efficiently enough as it would require a 
long time for the chain to move from one point in the parameter space to another. In 
general, for the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm, an acceptance rate that ranges from 
25-50% is desired, and the acceptance rate can be tuned by altering the variance of the 





 MCMC theory guarantees that if the markov chain for sampling the posterior 
distribution is aperiodic, irreducible and positive recurrent, then the markov chain will 
converge to the posterior distribution eventually as the run time of the chain approaches 
infinity. In practice, since no markov chains can be run to infinity, convergence of the 
markov chain is not guaranteed and therefore must be tested to ensure that the MCMC 
samples obtained truly correspond to samples drawn from the posterior distribution. 
Based on the theoretic properties of a converged markov chain, several convergence 
diagnostics algorithms, such as Raftery-Lewis diagnostic, Gelman-Rubin diagnostic, 
have been developed, yet these diagnostic algorithms in general can only suggest but 
cannot confirm convergence (Bolker, 2008). In this study, for simplicity, I shall only 
diagnose markov chains convergence by visual inspection. The visual inspection 
method plots for each parameter the time series of the parameter values (the plot is also 
known as the „trace plot‟). Figure 3.4 shows the appearance of a well-mixed markov 
chain and a badly-mixed markov chain. Good-mixing indicates that markov chain is 








3.1.5 Bayesian Model Selection  
 Model selection (aka model comparison) is the process of choosing from a set of 
models a model that is regarded as the most „appropriate‟ given the data. An appropriate 
model is defined as a model that fits reasonably well to data with a sensible number of 
parameters. The challenge in model selection lies in the fact that models with more 
parameters in general will have greater variability thus would tend to fit better to data 
than models with fewer parameters – a dilemma known as the bias-variance tradeoff in 
the modelling and statistical literature. When selecting an appropriate model, one must 
balance the gain in goodness-of-fit for each added parameter and decide when the gain 
in goodness-of-fit is marginal and drop parameters that are thought to be unnecessary.  
 
 Unlike the Frequentist paradigm which has no means of comparing models, the 
Bayesian paradigm is able to treat model selection as an inference problem and solve it 
using formal approaches. In brief, Bayesian model comparison treats each model as a 
hypothesis and assigns a prior probability to each of them, then each model pair is 
compared by computing a quantity known as the Bayes Factor, which gives indication 
to which model the data supports better (Bolker, 2008). However, in this study, I shall 
employ another approach, known as the Deviance Information Criterion (DIC) 






Deviance Information Criterion 
 Deviance Information Criterion (DIC) is a Bayesian model comparison method 
which can be conveniently computed from MCMC samples (Spiegelhalter et al., 2002). 
To compute DIC, deviance is defined as: 
                      (3.17) 
where        is the likelihood of the model with all normalising constants included. 
DIC is then given by: 
                (3.18) 
                     (3.19) 
where             is the posterior mean of deviance;       is the deviance calculated at the 
posterior mean of the parameters (Bolker, 2008). 
 
 Similar to the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC), a model with lower DIC is 
generally regarded as a better model. The implication of the difference in DIC between 
2 models is similar to AIC too, where a difference of less than 5 is generally considered 
weak ; a difference of 5 to 10 is considered positive; and a difference of more than 10 is 
considered strong (Table 3.1). 
 
Table 3.1  Difference in DIC and the corresponding evidence for a better model 
     Evidence for a better model 
> 10 Strong 
5 – 10 Positive 





 To evaluate the effect of school closure on HSI transmission in Hong Kong, I fitted 
the model described in Wu et al (2010a) to e-flu data collected from June through 
September 2009 under a Bayesian framework to estimate the effective reproductive 
number (Rt) of the HSI virus in Hong Kong during the surveillance period. Having 
observed that the model from Wu et al (2010a) („Model 1‟ hereafter) fitted poorly to 
surveillance data in the additional month (data in September, which was not analysed in 
Wu et al. (2010a)), I refined the model twice by adding additional transmission 
characteristics to the model, resulting in a total of 3 models being fitted to data (referred 
as „Model 2‟ and‟ Model 3‟, respectively). The effect of school closure on transmission 
of HSI in Hong Kong is then assessed by noting the changes in Rt associated with 
school closure in the best model, where the best model is selected using DIC. 
Implementation of the model and the inference of Model 3 are provided in Appendix 8. 
3.2.1 Transmission Model 
 Following the methodology described in Wu et al. (2010a), I applied a 
deterministic, population-based, age-structured SIR model with 3 age classes (C1-3) to 
describe the transmission dynamics of the HSI epidemic in Hong Kong from June 
through September 2009. The age classes correspond to kindergarten and primary 
school students (C1), secondary school students (C2), and adults (C3), and their age 
boundaries are 0-12, 13-19, 20+, respectively. The model assumes that the epidemic 
was triggered by imported cases entering Hong Kong, with an average of    cases 
entering per day for age class   since 1 June (3 days earlier than the symptom onset 
date of the first non-imported case (Wu et al., 2010a)). Transmission of HSI amongst 
C1-3 is assumed to follow the social contact hypothesis, and in Model 1 and Model 2, 
C1, C2 individuals are assumed to be   times more susceptible than C3 individuals, 
whereas in Model 3, C1, C2 individuals are assumed to be    and    times more 
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susceptible than C3 individuals, respectively. The age-contact pattern of Hong Kong 
population is assumed to be similar to that of the German population (selection details 
are outlined in Box 3.5), and the matrix of „all contacts‟ were chosen since influenza is 
known to spread via both physical and non-physical contacts. Details on converting the 
age stratification of the age-contact matrix from Mossong et al. (2008) into the 3 age 
groups concerned are outlined in Box 3.6. The resultant     contact matrix    is 
then used to calculate the WAIFW matrix ( ) in 2 steps: First, in Model 1 and Model 2, 
the first 2 rows of    is multiplied by      , whereas in Model 3, the first row of 
   is multiplied by        and the second row by       ; Second, the resultant 
matrix in all 3 models were multiplied to a scaling constant such that the leading 
eigenvalue of the NGM is R0. Following Wu et al. (2010a), all 3 models assume Tg of 
HSI is 3 days. 
 
 With regard to the impact of school closure on the transmissibility of the HSI virus, 
the models makes the following assumptions: Prior to the identification of the first 
non-imported case, all 3 models assume transmissibility of the HSI virus remained 
constant. On 12 June when kindergarten and primary schools were closed as part of the 
government‟s containment phase measures, all 3 model assume transmissibility of HSI 
within C1 was reduced by a proportion   (i.e.     is multiplied by      ) as a result 
of reduced contact amongst this age group, and Model 2 and Model 3 further assume 
transmissibility between C1 and C3 increased by a proportion   (i.e.     and     
were multiplied by      ) as a result of increased contact between these 2 age groups. 
Similarly, on 10 July when secondary schools commenced summer holiday, all 3 
models assume transmissibility within C2 was reduced by the same factor   (i.e.     
is multiplied by      ), and Model 2 and Model 3 further assume transmissibility 
between C2 and C3 increased by the same factor   (i.e.     and     were multiplied 
by      ). Transmissibility of the virus is assumed to remain constant during 
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summer holiday in all 3 models, and on 1 September when the new school season began, 
all 3 models assume transmissibility of the virus reverts back to the original state before 
school closure and remained constant throughout September (i.e. entries of   are no 
longer multiplied by   and  ). All 3 models assume a constant reporting ratio  % in 
all 3 age classes, and each case was confirmed exactly 2 days after initial infection. 
 
 In summary, the HSI epidemic in Hong Kong from 1 June through 27 September is 
simulated with the following equations: 
 
      
  
               
     
  
 
   
  
      
  
                
     
  
 
   
              
(3.20) 
(3.21) 
where   is the age of the epidemic in days;      ,      ,      , is the number of 
susceptible, infectious and recovered individuals in age class   at time  ;    is the 
population size of age class  ;   is the recovery rate;    is the average number of 
infectious visitors entering Hong Kong in age class  ; and        is the WAIFW matrix 
(time-and-model-dependent as described above). The values of          were 
obtained from data published in “Projections of Population Distribution 2009-2018” by 
the Planning Department of the Hong Kong Government (Planning Department, 2009). 
The equations were solved by Euler method at time step 0.05 day. 
 
 A total of 7 parameters (R0,  ,  ,   ,   ,   ,  ) in Model 1, 8 parameters in 
Model 2 (all parameters in Model 1 + parameter  ), and 9 parameters in Model 3 (all 
parameters in Model 2, replacing   by    and   ), are to be inferred from data. 




As mentioned in Box 3.2, Mossong et al. (2008) published age-contact matrix data in 8 
European countries, and I shall use data from Mossong et al. (2008) as proxy for age-contact 
matrix data in Hong Kong. This extension box describes the selection of age-contact matrix 
data from 1 country (out of the 8) that is thought to most resemble the age-contact pattern of 
the Hong Kong population based on the age-structure of the population. 
Intuitively, besides of the social mixing behaviour of the population, the contact 
frequencies in the age contact matrix is also influenced by the population size of the age 
classes. An illustrative example would be – if certain age class has a small population size 
(say 0), then contact with this age class would have to be small (and 0 in our extreme 
example). Therefore, the country with the smallest difference in population age structure 
compared to Hong Kong should have an age contact pattern that is the most similar. 
To select the country with the smallest difference in population age structure compared 
to Hong Kong, data on the population size of the 9 regions (8 countries plus Hong Kong) in 
2009 were obtained from U.S. Census Bureau International Data Base for comparison. Since 
my model is concerned with the 3 age groups (<13, 13-19, 20+) yet population size data were 
given in quinquennial age groups (0-4, 5-9… ,70+), the data was therefore first converted to 
the 3 age groups concerned (assuming even distribution per age within each age group) and is 
then normalised by the total population size. The difference in population age structured of 
each country compared to Hong Kong is then calculated by: (1) subtracting the normalised 
population sizes of the 3 age groups by that of Hong Kong. (2) summing the absolute value of 
the differences obtained from the (1). The figure below shows the results. 
  
As it can be observed, Germany has the minimum difference. I therefore used the age 




























Difference in population age structure of the 8 European countries in 
Mossong et al (2008) compared to Hong Kong  in 2009 
Box 3.5 Selecting age contact matrix data from Mossong et al. (2008) that should be  




As the epidemic model employed in this study divides the Hong Kong population into 
3 age groups, age-contact matrix data from Mossong et al. (2008) needs be converted from its 
quinquennial age stratification to the 3 age groups concerned for it to be applied in the model. 
This extension box outlines the methodology for doing so. 
To understand the methodology, it is necessary to start from the unit of the contact 
matrix. By convention, the contact matrix is specified in „average number of contact person 
per unit time per person‟. To illustrate this, let   denote the contact matrix below and let the 
time unit of   be 1 day, the entry     would then represent “the average number of group 
  persons a group   person contacts per day”. Hence, the matrix should be read column-wise, 
where each column denotes the contact characteristics of a person in the group the column 
represents. For example, a group „c‟ person in   contacts on average 1.03 group „a‟ persons, 






It should be noted that, the amount of contact between 2 groups of populations in  , 
say, group „a‟ and „b‟, is calculated by multiplying     and     by    and    (the 
population size of the group „a‟ and „b‟). In other words, it is equal to       or       
(      and       should be equal theoretically since contact is bi-directional, however, 
they do not equal to each other in practise). Multiplying by the population size is necessary 
since the entries of   is specified at the per capita level. Calculation of population-level 
contacts is needed for reducing the dimension of the age-contact matrix (explained below). 
Let   denote the age-contact matrix of Germany from Mossong et al. (2008) and let 
  denote the age-contact matrix of the model. To obtain   from  , a two-step calculation 
is required: First, since the age stratification of   and   are 0-4, 5-9, 10-14,…, 70+ and 
0-12, 13-19, 20+, respectively, the age group 0-12, 13-19 in   overlap the age group 10-14 
in  , hence this age group in   needs to be split into age groups 10-12 and 13-14. Second, 
once there is no overlaps between the age groups in   and  , the entries of   are calculated 
from the corresponding entries of   by averaging contacts at the population-level. 
Box 3.6 Reducing the dimension of the age-contact matrix from Mossong et al. (2008) 
 
















To split the age group 10-14 in   into age groups 10-12 and 13-14, I assumed that 
individuals in 10-12 and 13-14 have the same contact characteristics and the population size 
of the age group 10-12 and 13-14 is 3/5 and 2/5 of that of the 10-14 age group. Hence, the 
row 10-14 in   is split into 2 rows – 10-12 and 13-14, with entry values in the 10-12 and 
13-14 row equal to the corresponding entry in the 10-14 row multiplied by 3/5 and 2/5, 
respectively. Afterwards, the column of 10-14 is then duplicated to yield a column each for 





To calculate the entries of  , population-level contact averaging is done as follows. 
First, each column of the resultant matrix from above is multiplied by the population size of 
the age groups (data on population sizes were taken from the German population in 2009 
from the US Census Data Base). Second, the entries of   is calculated by adding the 
corresponding entries in   that satisfy the age boundary then dividing the sum by the 
population size of the age group of the column in  . For example, to calculate the entry 
            (highlighted below), entries from            to              (inside the 
bounded region) is first added up, and the sum is then divided by       . The other entries 





The resultant entry values of D is shown below. The values are corrected to the 








































10-12 3 3 3 3 3 







0-12 13-19 20+ 
0-12 2.98 1.23 0.52 
13-19 1.12 3.98 0.65 
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3.2.2 Bayesian Inference 
Prior 
 Flat non-informative priors were assumed for all model parameters in Model 1-3. 
The boundary value for each parameter are listed in Table 3.2. 
 
Table 3.2  Parameter boundary values 
Parameter Parameter Description Range ([lower, upper]) 
         Average number of HSI infected visitors  
entering Hong Kong in age class C1-3 
[0,10] 
   Basic Reproductive Number [1,2] 
        Relative increase in susceptibility to HSI infection  
of C1 & C2 compared to C3 
[0,10] 
  Increase in inter-age group transmission between  
C1-C3 and C2-C3 under school closure 
[0,10] 
  Percentage reduction in intra-age group transmission 
under school closure 
[0, 1] 
  Reporting ratio [0, 1] 
 
Likelihood Function 
 Following the formulation in Wu et al. (2010a), the likelihood function is assumed 
to be the Poisson distribution, and the number of cases confirmed on each day in each 
age class are assumed independent. Together, the likelihood function becomes: 
                                 
          
   
    
 
   
    
   
 ( 3.22) 
 
where       is the number of days confirmation date data was available and is equal 
to 110 (June 10 – Sep27);           are the expected and the observed number of 
confirmed cases in age class   on day  , respectively.  
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Markov Chain Monte Carlo 
 The metropolis random walk algorithm was applied to obtain MCMC samples 
from the posterior distributions of the model parameters, in which a random step size is 
chosen for each parameter at each iteration. The step size for each parameter was drawn 
from a uniform distribution        , where   is the difference between the lower 
bound and the upper bound of the parameter divided by 1000 (              
                   ) and 1000 was chosen by fine tuning such that acceptance rate 
of the MCMC runs ranged between 25-40%. To speed up convergence, parameter 
estimates from Wu et al. (2010a) were used as starting values for my model parameters 
where applicable. In each model, the markov chain was run for       iterations and 
the final       iterations were used for obtaining the posterior distribution of model 
parameters. Trace plots and kernel density plots of the MCMC samples were drawn in 
the statistical computing language R version 2.13 (64-bit) (R Development Core Team, 
2009), using the CODA package version 0.14-4 (Plummer et al., 2006). 
 
Model Simulation 
 The models were simulated at the posterior mean of the parameters to observe the 
fit of each model to the actual epidemic curve data. 
 
Model Comparison 
 For model comparison, Deviance information Criterion (DIC) for each model 
were computed from their MCMC samples and the difference in their DIC values were 
computed. The model with the least DIC is regarded as the best model, and a model is 
regarded as significantly better than the other when the difference in DIC value between 




3.3.1 Model parameter values and model fit to data for Model 1-3 
Model 1 
 Model 1 is the model adapted from Wu et al. (2010a). Figure 3.5 shows the fit of 
Model 1 to epidemic curve data, Figure 3.6 shows the posterior distribution of Model 1 
parameters, Table 3.3 show their summary statistics, and trace plot of the MCMC 
samples are shown in Appendix 9. It can be seen that Model 1 does not fit well to the 
data, hence the estimated values of the parameters are not meaningful since the 
transmission dynamics described in the model differs significantly from the actual 




Figure 3.5  Model 1 epidemic curve (solid line) against actual epidemic curve (dotted line) of C1-3 
from 10 June through 27 September 2009. 
Epidemic curve colour for C1-3 are indicated in legend at top left. 








Figure 3.6  Posterior distribution of Model 1 parameters 
 
Table 3.3  Model 1: Estimated parameter values 
Parameter Description Posterior mean 95% CI 
   
Average number of HSI infected visitors 
entering Hong Kong in age class C1-3 
6.09 [2.93, 7.58] 
   0.43 [0.00, 4.03] 
   7.06 [2.24, 10.00] 
   Basic Reproduction Number 1.35 [1.33, 1.37] 
  
Relative increase in susceptibility to HSI 
infection of C1 & C2 compared to C3 
2.90 [2.81, 2.99] 
  
Percentage reduction in intra-age group 
transmission under school closure 
26.7% [25.1%, 28.2%] 





 Model 2 is a refinement of Model 1. In Model 2, inter-age group transmission 
between C1 and C3 and between C2 and C3 are assumed to have increased during 
school closure, hence when the new school season began in September, incidence in C3 
cases would reduce as the increase in inter-age group transmissions was no longer 
present. Figure 3.7 shows the fit of Model 2 to epidemic curve data, Figure 3.8 shows 
the posterior distribution of the parameters, Table 3.4 give their summary statistics, and 
trace plot of the MCMC samples are shown in Appendix 10. In Figure 3.7, it can be 
observed that the epidemic curve of C3 in Model 2 fitted considerably better than 
Model 1, yet the epidemic curve of C1 and C2 still fitted poorly to data. The latter 
implies there are transmission characteristics in the real world that have not been 
accounted in the model and hence further refinement is necessary. 
 
  
Figure 3.7  Model 2 epidemic curve (solid line) against actual epidemic curve (dotted line) of C1-3 
from 10 June through 27 September 2009. 
Epidemic curve colour for C1-3 are indicated in legend at top left. 






Figure 3.8  Posterior distribution of Model 2 parameters 
 
Table 3.4  Model 2: Estimated parameter values 
Parameter Description Posterior mean 95% CI 
   
Average number of HSI infected visitors 
entering Hong Kong in age class C1-3 
9.16 [3.66, 10.00] 
   1.52 [0.00, 4.59] 
   1.25 [0.00, 3.34] 
   Basic Reproduction Number 1.34 [1.32, 1.36] 
  
Relative increase in susceptibility to HSI 
infection of C1 & C2 compared to C3 
4.59 [4.41, 4.76] 
  
Increase in transmission between  
C1, C2 & C3 under school closure 
1.92 [1.84, 2.00] 
  
Percentage reduction in intra-age group 
transmission under school closure 
98.7% [95. 5%, 100%] 





 Model 3 is a refinement of Model 2. Unlike Model 2 which assumes both C1 and 
C2 individuals are   times more susceptible to infection than C3 individuals, Model 3 
assumes C1 and C2 individuals are assumed to be    times and    times more 
susceptible than C3 individuals, respectively. Figure 3.9 shows the fit of Model 3 to 
epidemic curve data, Figure 3.10 shows the posterior distribution of the parameters, Table 
3.5 shows their posterior summary statistics, and trace plots of the MCMC samples are 
shown in Appendix 11. In Figure 3.9, it can be observed that the misfit in the epidemic 




Figure 3.9  Model 3 epidemic curve (solid line) against actual epidemic curve (dotted line) of C1-3 
from 10 June through 27 September 2009. 
Epidemic curve colour for C1-3 are indicated in legend at top left. 







Figure 3.10  Posterior distribution of Model 3 parameters 
Table 3.5  Model 3: Estimated parameter values 
Parameter Description Posterior mean 95% CI 
   
Average number of HSI infected visitors 
entering Hong Kong in age class C1-3 
9.23 [1.18, 10.00] 
   9.70 [5.73, 10.00] 
   9.35 [2.24, 10.00] 
   Basic Reproduction Number 1.18 [1.11, 1.19] 
   
Relative increase in susceptibility to HSI 
infection of C1 compared to C3 
5.98 [5.54, 6.18] 
   
Relative increase in susceptibility to HSI 
infection of C2 compared to C3 
2.65 [2.43, 2.76] 
  
Increase in transmission between  
C1, C2 & C3 under school closure 
2.04 [1.86, 2.20] 
  
Percentage reduction in intra-age group 
transmission under school closure 
88.4% [78.3%, 94.6%] 
  Reporting ratio 10.85% [9.1%, 38.7%] 
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3.3.2 Model Comparison 
 DIC values of Model 1-3 are shown in Table 3.6. The DIC of Model 3 is the lowest 
and it is considerably lower than that of Model 1 and Model 2 (on the order of 
thousands), hence the additional parameters in Model 3 are justified.  
 




Description DIC ΔDIC 
M1 7 
Adapted from Wu et al. (2010a),  
assumed constant reporting ratio 
8630.4 4636.0 
M2 8 
Adapted from Model1, assumed transmissibility  
between C1, C2 and C3 increased by         
during school closure 
7136.2 3141.8 
M3 9 
Adapted from Model 2, assumed differential  
susceptibility between C1 and C2 individuals 




3.3.3 Effect reproductive number of the HSI virus in Hong Kong in Model 3 
 According to Model 3, the effective reproductive number (Rt) of the HSI virus in 
Hong Kong from June through September was:    was initially 1.18 on 1 June (the 
assumed start date of the epidemic). On 12 June when kindergartens and primary 
schools were closed,    was reduced from 1.18 (11 June) to 1.05. On 10 July when 
secondary schools commenced summer holiday,    was raised slightly from 1.05 (9 
July) to 1.09, and it declined gradually from 1.09 during summer holiday due to the 
lessening of susceptible individuals in the population. On 1 September when the new 
school season began,    was raised from 1.06 (on 31 August) to 1.10 as a result of 
school resumption, afterwards,    declined gradually through September and reached 




3.4.1 Impact of school closure on HSI transmission 
 According to Model 3, the closure of kindergartens and primary schools on 12 
June reduced the effective reproductive number (Rt) of the HSI virus from 1.18 to 1.05, 
indicating that HSI transmission in Hong Kong was reduced by 11.0% by this 
intervention. However, the model also pointed out that when secondary schools 
commenced summer holiday on 10 July, Rt of the virus increased from 1.05 to 1.09 (this 
peculiar result will be explained below). Hence when secondary schools were closed, 
the net reduction in Rt of the virus was 0.09, corresponding to a 7.6% transmission 
reduction. On this basis, I conclude that transmission of HSI in Hong Kong was reduced 
by roughly 7.6% when kindergarten, primary and secondary schools were closed for 
summer holiday.  
 
 My study obtained a slightly different result compared to Wu et al. (2010a), which 
reported that HSI transmission in Hong Kong was reduced by 25% when summer 
holiday commenced. The cause of this difference stems primarily from the inclusion of 
e-flu data collected in September in my analysis, which revealed the model employed in 
Wu et al. (2010a) (Model 1) was insufficient to explain the observed data and 
subsequently led me to refine the model by adding additional transmission 
characteristics (i.e. parameters). First, I added the characteristic of “increased inter-age 
group contact between C1 and C3 and between C2 and C3 (C1 represents kindergarten 
and primary school students, C2 represents secondary school students, C3 represents 
adults) during school closure leading to increased transmission between these age 
groups” (parameter  ) to account for the observed decrease in incidence in C3 cases in 
September when school season resumed. Second, I replaced the assumption of “equal 
infection susceptibility in C1 and C2 compared to C3” assumed in Model 1 with 
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“different infection susceptibility in C1 and C2 compared to C3” (parameter   
     ) to amend for the misfit in the epidemic curve of C1 and C2 in September in the 
model. The first added transmission characteristic (that transmission increased between 
C1 and C3 and between C2 and C3 during school closure) is the reason to the increase 
in Rt of the HSI virus when secondary schools commenced summer holiday – despite 
contact amongst C2 individuals was reduced as a result of school closure, contacts 
between C2 and C3 individuals was increased as result, which subsequently led to an 
increase in overall transmission of the virus amongst the 3 age groups (the is analogous 
to the rate-determining step concept in chemical reactions: the rate in a certain step of 
the reaction was reduced but the rate in the rate-determining step was increased, leading 
to an increase in the overall rate of reaction). This result highlights the importance of 
putting the indirect effect of an intervention into consideration when evaluating its 
effectiveness. Furthermore, it also highlights that the overall transmission of HSI in 
Hong Kong is not necessarily reduced by school closure despite this intervention 
appears to have reduced incidence in school-aged children, which echoes with my 
initial intention of performing this study. 
 
 
3.4.2 Limitation and discussion 
 My study has a number of major limitations. First and foremost, the study, being a 
modelling study which deliberately makes assumption to simplify reality, is 
assumption-strong, yet no sensitivity analysis was performed to test the effect of the 
assumptions. As mentioned in the introduction of this chapter, the definitive way of 
testing the „correctness‟ of a model would be to validate it by comparing model 
prediction against actual observed incidence data (that were not used in inference). 
However, since enhanced surveillance on HSI in Hong Kong was halted after 27
 
September 2009, validation is not possible in the absence of data. Second, my model 
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assumed kindergartens started the new school year on the same date as primary and 
secondary schools, which is known to be not true but assumption is unavoidable since 
no data on their resumption date is available. Third, my model did not account for the 
mitigative effect of reactive school closure. Given that commutation data of the Hong 
Kong population is available from population census, it is actually possible to construct 
a district-explicit model to account for the mitigative effect of reactive school closure 
within the district. However, the number of parameters in such a model would be huge, 
which would have complicated the inference process. Furthermore, from a modelling 
perspective, it is uncertain how much benefit would be attained given that number of 
reactively closed schools was generally small (Table 1.3). Fourth, this study has used an 
SIR model rather than an SEIR (Susceptible-Exposed-Infectious-Recovered) model to 
account for the transmission dynamics of the HSI epidemic in Hong Kong. Since the 
natural history of influenza contains an incubation period of 1-2 days, the SEIR model 
would be a more appropriate model for this study (Wearing et al., 2005). However, it 
was decided early in this study that using the SIR model was a more practical choice 
since it provided a means to validate the correctness of the model and the inference 
(through comparison with the results of Wu et al. (2010a) using the same dataset). 
Lastly, with regard to the plausibility of the two added transmission characteristics in 
my model (that children- adult transmission increased during school closure as a result 
of increase in contact frequency, and susceptibility to HSI infection between 
individuals aged 0-12 (C1) and 13-19 (C2) are different), while I believe the first 
assumption is highly plausible since children are likely to be looked after by parents 
during school closure, the second assumption is less so since – while it is known that 
individuals aged >65 had cross-reactive antibody against HSI, there is no biological 
reason nor data supporting that there was a difference in susceptibility to HSI infection 
between individuals aged 0-12 and 13-19, hence it is possible that the second 
assumption was only an artefact resulted from the assumptions of the model.  
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Chapter 4  
Discussion 
4.1 Study Findings 
 This study has shown that HSI incidence in primary and secondary school-aged 
children in Hong Kong drastically increased when primary and secondary schools 
resumed session in September (Chapter 2). This study has also shown that, by 
classifying persons aged below 20 as school-aged children and otherwise as adults, 
school closure and summer holiday reduced HSI transmission amongst school-aged 
children but increased HSI transmission between school-aged children and adults, 
which subsequently led to a decrease in HSI incidence in school-aged children, an 
increase in HSI incidence in adults, and a 7.6% reduction in the overall HSI 
transmission in the community (Chapter 3). The first result provides evidence for the 
commonly employed assumption in pandemic influenza planning that school session 
facilitates pandemic influenza transmission amongst school-aged children. The second 
result characterises the effect of school closure on HSI incidence in school-aged 
children and adult, provides a quantitative assessment on the effectiveness of school 
closure in reducing HSI transmission in Hong Kong, and highlights the importance of 
considering the indirect effect of an intervention when evaluating its effectiveness. 





4.2 Study Limitations 
 The limitations of this study concerning the analyses applied in each chapter  
were discussed specifically in the discussion section. In brief, in chapter 2, the main 
limitation was that no statistical analysis was applied to test the association between 
school resumption and the observed increase in HSI incidence in primary and 
secondary school-aged children, therefore the study lacked statistical evidence 
indicating whether the observation was indeed associated to school resumption or it 
was only a misconception on the trend of the epidemic curve; in chapter 3, the main 
limitation was that the model developed for analysing surveillance data was assumption 
strong yet no sensitivity analysis nor model validation was performed to test the 
assumptions and correctness of the model, hence the robustness of the results and the 
subsequent conclusion are unknown. 
 
 Other than the abovementioned limitations, this study has 3 more notable 
shortcomings. First, this study has assumed that temporal changes in HSI incidence was 
caused only by changes in school session and has neglected the effect of other 
mitigation measures implemented in the mitigation phase. Given that antiviral 
treatment, isolation of confirmed cases and other measures were also implemented, it is 
likely that these measures had also influenced transmission of the epidemic. Though the 
effect of these measures were not considered in this study and hence the study 
conclusion would only hold if the neglected measures offered little mitigative effect 
compared to that of school closure. Second, this study has neglected the seasonality of 
influenza. In Hong Kong, there are usually 2 influenza seasons in the year – one in 
January-April and the other in June-September (Centre for Health Protection, 2009a). 
As the first wave of Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 in Hong Kong overlapped with the second 
influenza season, it is possible that the factors that cause influenza seasonality had 
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influenced transmission of the HSI epidemic and thereby affecting the conclusion of 
this study as those factors were not accounted for. However, it remains uncertain 
whether the factors that cause influenza seasonality would act in the pandemic setting, 
as factors such as “loss of host immunity through antigenic drift of the influenza virus” 
would logically not apply, whereas factors such as changes in temperature, humidity 
and host social mixing behaviour should still remain. Third, this study has neglected the 
difference in HSI confirmation rate between different age groups, notably between 
school-aged children and adults. In Hong Kong, to prevent communicable diseases in 
schools, the CHP advises all local kindergarten/childcare-centre, primary and 
secondary schools to maintain a daily record of each student‟s body temperature 
(usually measured by their parents before sending them to school) (Centre for Health 
Protection, 2009b). It is known that in some schools, particularly in primary schools, 
that teachers and volunteering parents would measure students‟ temperature at the 
school gate on each school day to ensure that febrile children are detected. Logically, 
such measures would have increased the HSI confirmation rate in children (as febrile 
children were likely to be instructed to seek medical attention), and differences in the 
implementation of student temperature recording amongst kindergartens, primary and 
secondary schools would have also affected the HSI confirmation rate amongst the 
different types of students. The actual HSI confirmation rate amongst the different age 
groups of this study is unknown, but it was implicitly assumed that they did not differ 
significantly. Should there be significant differences between the age-specific HSI 




4.3 Comments on using school closure in future influenza pandemics 
 Finally, having investigated the effect of school closure in mitigating transmission 
of Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 in Hong Kong, I would like to draw on the findings of this 
study and comment on the use of school closure in Hong Kong in future influenza 
pandemics. Specifically, I shall give comments on 2 topics: First, I shall discuss how 
the findings of this study may affect the decision of applying school closure in Hong 
Kong in future influenza pandemics. Second, I shall give recommendation on how 
school closure may be best implemented in Hong Kong in future influenza pandemics 
considering from the likely outcome to be expected from applying this intervention. 
 
How this study may affect the decision of school closure in HK in future flu pandemics 
 To illustrate how this study may affect the decision of applying school closure in 
Hong Kong in future influenza pandemics, it may be best to start with a figure. 
 
Figure 4.1  Projected age-specific epidemic curves of the first wave of Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 in 
Hong Kong using model 3 from chapter 3 (the best-fit epidemic model), assuming school closure 
continued into the new school season (left), and school session resumed in September (right). 
Projected epidemic curves (solid lines); e-flu epidemic curves (dotted lines); The day which the epidemic 
peaked (grey vertical line); The day pandemic vaccine was available for public administration (orange 
vertical line). Peak incidence indicated in the diagram is adjusted for underreporting. 
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 Figure 4.1 shows projected age-specific epidemic curves of the first wave of 
Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 in Hong Kong simulated under 2 assumed scenarios. The first 
simulation assumed that proactive school closure was continued into the new school 
season and it can be regarded as a projection of the hypothetical epidemic if school 
closure were applied until the arrival of pandemic vaccine in mid-December, whilst the 
second simulation assumed that school season was resumed in September and it can be 
regarded as a projection of the epidemic in reality. By comparing the 2 sets of epidemic 
curves, 2 conclusions can be drawn: First, it can be observed that, the time when the 
epidemic arrived to its peak in the first simulation (school closure until vaccine arrival) 
is only 11 days behind that in the second simulation (reality), and that in both 
simulations the epidemic is largely over by the time vaccine arrived, implying that even 
if school closure were applied throughout the first wave of Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 in 
Hong Kong, the delay induced to the epidemic would still have been insufficient for 
pandemic vaccine to arrive in time; Second, it can be observed that, while closing 
schools throughout the pandemic would have reduced peak incidence of the epidemic 
from 6894 to 6395 (a 7.2% reduction), the intervention would have actually raised the 
incidence in adults (C3) and caused them to be the dominant infected group, suggesting 
that more disruption on the functioning of society could have been caused as adults are 
the workforce of the society. Given that HSI has an unusually high attack rate in the 
younger aged population which implies that HSI was primarily transmitted by them, I 
believe it is reasonable to assume that the mitigative power of school closure in Hong 
Kong in future influenza pandemics will be lower than that in Pandemic (H1N1) 2009. 
Therefore, on this basis, this study suggests that prolong school closure in Hong Kong 
during a future influenza pandemic is unlikely to be able to grant pandemic vaccine to 
arrive in time, and whilst implementing this intervention in a future influenza pandemic 
may reduce peak incidence of the epidemic, it may actually raise the incidence in adults 
and subsequently cause more disruption to the functioning of society.  
 113 
 
Recommendation on how school closure may be best implemented in HK in future flu 
pandemics considering from the likely outcome expected from applying this measure  
 Given that the findings of this study suggest that implementing school closure in 
Hong Kong during a future influenza pandemic is effective in reducing peak incidence 
of the epidemic yet prolong school closure is insufficient to grant pandemic vaccine to 
arrive in time, I believe the most appropriate way to apply school closure in Hong Kong 
in a future influenza pandemic would be to implement the intervention only during the 
peak of the epidemic for relieving the burden on the healthcare system. Specifically, I 
recommend proactive school closure to be applied to all local kindergartens/childcare- 
centres, primary and secondary schools during the peak of the future influenza 
pandemic, and the closure is to be activated on 2 conditions: either when the additional 
medical services allocated for pandemic mitigation as stated in Hong Kong‟s influenza 
pandemic response plan (e.g. designated flu clinics, additional hospitalisation capacity) 
is thought to soon not be able to meet the increasing health demand from the pandemic; 
or when the level of absenteeism in school can no longer sustain teaching. As to the 
time for resuming school session, I suggest that schools should reopen once real-time 
surveillance data shows that the pandemic in Hong Kong has subsided and school 
resumption is thought not to lead to further outbreaks. My reasoning to this proposal is 
as follows: First, in Pandemic (H1N1) 2009, school closure was immediately started in 
Hong Kong once local transmission of HSI was detected. Given that early in the 
pandemic the burden on healthcare system is unlikely to be high, I believe school 
closure at this stage is unnecessary and it is therefore more sensible to activate school 
closure at a later time as it would shorten the duration of closure; Second, I have chosen 
to apply proactive school closure over reactive school closure in my recommendation. 
The reason for this choice is twofold: first, proactive school closure is comparatively 
easier to implement since it requires less communication with the public and would 
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therefore cause less inconvenience; second, the level of school absenteeism during the 
peak of the epidemic is likely to be high thus proactive school closure may be a wiser 
option as schools may not be able to sustain teaching under such circumstances.  
 
 Regarding the strengths and weaknesses of this proposed school closure scheme: 
As for its strengths, since school closure is activated on an as-needed basis under this 
proposed scheme, it minimises the duration of school closure and may potentially avoid 
unnecessary activation of this socio-economically-costly intervention in non-severe 
influenza pandemics (such as Pandemic (H1N1) 2009). Furthermore, since the public 
are able to witness the need for school closure (such as an overwhelming of illness in 
schools) before the intervention is activated, it may increase the public‟s understanding 
and subsequently their acceptance and compliance to this measure; As for its weakness, 
this proposed scheme may – as this study suggests – increase incidence of pandemic 
infection in adults, which may subsequently lead to greater work absenteeism and thus 
more disruption to the functioning of society during the peak of the epidemic. It is 
therefore advised that the Department of Health should consider discontinuing school 
closure if surveillance data shows that the CFR or hospitalisation-rate of the pandemic 
infection in adults is much higher than that in children.  
 
 Lastly, regarding the probable duration of school closure in future influenza 
pandemics under this proposed scheme, considering that the course of Pandemic 
(H1N1) 2009 in Hong Kong was roughly 7 months, I believe the duration of school 
closure in a severe influenza pandemic could be on the order of months. It is therefore 
advised that the Education Bureau should plan for alternative methods for conducting 
teaching during school closure (such as teaching over the internet) since closure of such 
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Appendix 1. Reporting criteria for suspected HSI cases from 26 April to 16 June, 2009.  









Appendix 2. Reporting criteria for suspected HSI cases from 17 June to 26 June, 2009. 








Appendix 3. Reporting criteria for suspected HSI cases from 27 June to 27 September, 2009. 







Appendix 4. Laboratory testing criteria for HSI cases at DFCs and public hospitals A&E 
departments from 28
 
September 2009 onwards.  
(Extracted from CHP letters to doctors reference number: (42) in DH SEB CD 8/91/9. Available at 
http://www.chp.gov.hk/files/pdf/ltd_20090925.pdf) 




Appendix 5  List of kindergartens/childcare-centres reactively closed from July to Sep 2009 




Sheung Shui Wai Chow Kindergarten (Branch) North N 2009-08-20 
Victoria (Harbour Green) Kindergarten Yau Tsim Mong E 2009-08-26 





Appendix 6. List of primary schools reactively closed in September 2009 (N=19) 




Renaissance College (Primary Section) Sha Tin R 2009-09-02 
Shatin Tsung Tsin School Sha Tin R 2009-09-05 
The Wofoo Foundation Limited Joseph Lee Primary School Yuen Long M 2009-09-15 
Chinese International School Eastern C 2009-09-17 
Alliance Primary School, Sheung Shui North N 2009-09-22 
Ho Shun Primary School (Sponsored by Sik Sik Yuen) Tsuen Wan K 2009-09-22 
The Federation of Alumni Associations of the Chinese University of 
Hong Kong Thomas Cheung School 
Sha Tin R 2009-09-22 
The Church of Christ in China Heep Woh Primary School Yau Tsim Mong E 2009-09-22 
Christian Alliance H.C. Chan Primary School Sha Tin R 2009-09-22 
Sheng Kung Hui Fung Kei Millennium Primary School Kowloon City G 2009-09-22 
Ma Tau Chung Government Primary School (Hung Hom Bay) Kowloon City G 2009-09-22 
Ying Wa Primary School Sham Shui Po F 2009-09-22 
Cho Yiu Catholic Primary School Kwai Tsing S 2009-09-23 
Chan's Creative School Sham Shui Po F 2009-09-23 
Discovery College Kwai Tsing S 2009-09-23 
The Salvation Army Ann Wyllie Memorial Primary School Eastern C 2009-09-24 
Farm Road Government Primary School Kowloon City G 2009-09-25 
HKUGA Primary School Eastern C 2009-09-26 





Appendix 7. List of secondary school reactively closed from May through September, 2009 (N=68) 




United Christian College (Kowloon East) Kwun Tong J 2009-05-28 
St. Paul's Convent School Wan Chai B 2009-06-11 
Tang Shiu Kin Victoria Government Secondary School Wan Chai B 2009-06-16 
Australian International School Hong Kong Kowloon City G 2009-06-17 
Evangelize China Fellowship Saint Too Canaan College Kwun Tong J 2009-06-18 
Tung Wah Group of Hospitals Li Ka Shing College North N 2009-06-19 
English Schools Foundation King George V School Kowloon City G 2009-06-19 
English Schools Foundation South Island School Southern D 2009-06-19 
American International School Kowloon City G 2009-06-19 
Gifted Talent (Ellen Yeung) College Sai Kung Q 2009-06-19 
Lui Cheung Kwong Lutheran College Tuen Mun L 2009-06-20 
Chinese International School Eastern C 2009-06-20 
Ling Liang Church M.H. Lau Secondary School Tai Po P 2009-06-20 
YMCA of Hong Kong Christian College Islands T 2009-06-20 
Renaissance College (Secondary Section) Sha Tin R 2009-06-20 
Cotton Spinners Association Secondary School Kwai Tsing S 2009-06-21 
Lok Sin Tong Wong Chung Ming Secondary School Wong Tai Sin H 2009-06-21 
Heep Yunn School Kowloon City G 2009-06-21 
Delia Memorial School (Hip Wo) Kwun Tong J 2009-06-21 
Ning Po College Kwun Tong J 2009-06-21 
English Schools Foundation West Island School Southern D 2009-06-21 
Shap Pat Heung Rural Committee Kung Yik She Secondary School Yuen Long M 2009-06-21 
Po Leung Kuk Celine Ho Yam Tong College Wong Tai Sin H 2009-06-22 
Tsang Pik Shan Secondary School Sha Tin R 2009-06-24 
International Christian Quality Music Secondary and Primary School Wong Tai Sin H 2009-06-24 
The Church of Christ in China Kei Heep Secondary School Wong Tai Sin H 2009-06-25 
Buddhist Hung Sean Chau Memorial College Wong Tai Sin H 2009-06-25 
Rhenish Church Pang Hok-Ko Memorial College Kowloon City G 2009-06-25 
Aberdeen Baptist Lui Ming Choi College Southern D 2009-06-25 
Po Leung Kuk No.1 W.H. Cheung College Wong Tai Sin H 2009-06-25 
Kit Sam Lam Bing Yim Secondary School Wong Tai Sin H 2009-06-26 
Sheng Kung Hui Leung Kwai Yee Secondary School Kwun Tong J 2009-06-26 
Sacred Heart Canossian College Southern D 2009-06-26 
Tak Oi Secondary School Wong Tai Sin H 2009-06-27 
 124 
 
Diocesan Girls' School Yau Tsim Mong E 2009-06-27 
Carmel Secondary School Kowloon City G 2009-06-28 
Diocesan Boys' School Kowloon City G 2009-06-29 
Lee Kau Yan Memorial School Wong Tai Sin H 2009-06-29 
Kiangsu-Chekiang College Eastern C 2009-06-29 
German Swiss International School Central & Western A 2009-06-29 
Queen Elizabeth School Yau Tsim Mong E 2009-07-03 
Sing Yin Secondary School Kwun Tong J 2009-07-03 
Tsung Tsin Christian Academy Sham Shui Po F 2009-07-03 
Shatin Tsung Tsin Secondary School Sha Tin R 2009-07-10 
Shatin Pui Ying College Sha Tin R 2009-07-28 
Ng Wah Catholic Secondary School Wong Tai Sin H 2009-08-01 
Hong Kong International School Southern D 2009-08-27 
Hongkong Japanese School Eastern C 2009-09-02 
English Schools Foundation Sha Tin College Sha Tin R 2009-09-09 
Diocesan Boys' School Kowloon City G 2009-09-09 
Hong Kong Sea School Southern D 2009-09-10 
Mary Rose School Kowloon City G 2009-09-15 
Fukien Secondary School Kwun Tong J 2009-09-15 
Maryknoll Fathers' School (Secondary Section) Sham Shui Po F 2009-09-22 
St. Joseph's Anglo-Chinese School Kwun Tong J 2009-09-22 
Chinese International School Eastern C 2009-09-22 
Ho Yu College (Sponsored by Sik Sik Yuen) Islands T 2009-09-22 
Baptist Lui Ming Choi Secondary School Sha Tin R 2009-09-23 
Christian Nationals' Evangelism Commission Christian College Kwai Tsing S 2009-09-23 
Pentecostal Holiness Church Wing Kwong College Wong Tai Sin H 2009-09-23 
Ho Lap College (Sponsored by Sik Sik Yuen) Wong Tai Sin H 2009-09-23 
Tung Wah Group of Hospitals Lee Ching Dea Memorial College Eastern C 2009-09-23 
St. Paul's Secondary School Wan Chai B 2009-09-23 
St. Stephen's College Southern D 2009-09-23 
Po Leung Kuk Mrs. Ma Kam Ming Cheung Fook Sien College Islands T 2009-09-23 
Christian Alliance S.C. Chan Memorial College Tuen Mun L 2009-09-24 
Ko Lui Secondary School Kwun Tong J 2009-09-25 





Appendix 8  Model 3 implementation 
Makefile 
1. # File Name: Makefile   
2. # Description:    
3. #     This is the makefile for M3 models. It compiles the C++ code and makes    
4. #     the perl script executable.   
5. #        
6.    
7. # Makefile synatx   
8. # Target: dependencies.o files   
9. #       g++ ......   
10. #   ^   
11. #  must start with a tab   
12. #   
13. #   
14. # Special variables   
15. # $@ = Target   
16. # $^ = all dependencies   
17. # $< = the left most item of $^ 
18.    
19. GSL_CMD = -lgsl -lgslcblas   
20.    
21. mcmc = M3mcmc   
22. sim  = M3sim   
23.    
24. all: $(mcmc) $(sim)   
25.    
26. $(mcmc): M3mcmc.cpp M3Functions.cpp   
27.     g++ $< $(GSL_CMD) -o $@   
28.    
29. $(sim): M3sim.cpp M3Functions.cpp   
30.     g++ $< $(GSL_CMD) -o $@   
31.    
32. postmean.pl: postmean.pl   






1. // PROGRAM NAME: M3mcmc.cpp   
2. // AUTHOR: Carlos Chau   
3. //   
4. // PURPOSE: This script contains the main function of the program 'M3mcmc',   
5. //          which is a program that fits an epidemic model to the Pandemic   
6. //          (H1N1) 2009 surveillance data collected in Hong Kong from June   
7. //          through September (e-flu data).    
8. //   
9. //          Details of the data, model, and inference can be found in the CUHK   
10. //          MPhil thesis "Exploring the effect of school closure in mitigatin   
11. //          transmision of Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 in Hong Kong".   
12. //   
13. // INCLUDED FILES:   
14. //          This script includes "M3Functions.cpp", which is where the   
15. //          surveillance data, implementation of the model and the inference   
16. //          (Bayesian inference + Markov Chain Monte Carlo) are written in.   
17. //   
18. // INPUT:   1. Parameter File   (containing the starting values of the    
19. //             parameters for the MCMC)   
20. //   
21. //          2. Denominator value  [default=1000]   
22. //             (for dividing the stepsize of the proposal distribution. The   
23. //             large the value, the smaller the stepsizes)    
24. //   
25. //          3. Number of MCMC simulations (i.e. iterations)  [default = 5*10^6]   
26. //   
27. // OUTPUT:  A table containing the MCMC samples of the parameters and the   
28. //          corresponding log-likelihood value at each iteration, in a file   
29. //          named "init_param_file + denominator + number_of_iterations".   
30. //   
31. // FLOW:    1. Collect input from command line arguments   
32. //          2. Generate MCMC output filename   
33. //          3. Run the MCMC   
34. //            
35. // RUN THE PROGRAM BY: (*Optional arguments)    
36. //   
37. //          ./M3mcmc <param_file> <*denom> <*nsim>   
38. //   
39. // NOTE:    To monitor the progress of the MCMC, the program outputs progress at   
40. //          the at every 10^5 iterations completed   
41. //   
42. //          The program was run on an Intel(R) Core 2 Duo T7300 (2.0GHz, 2.0GHz)   
43. //          A run of 5*10^6 iterations required a run time of roughly 45 minutes   
44.    
45. #include <iostream>   
46. #include <fstream>   
47.    
48. using namespace std;   
49.    
50. #include "M3Functions.cpp"   
51.    
52.    
53. int main(int argc, char** argv)   
54. {   
55.     // 1.1 Read param_file   
56.     //--------------------   
57.                     
58.     // Check if Parameter File was specified   
59.     if (argc < 2)   
60.     {   
61.         cout << "Usage: " << argv[0]    
62.              << " <Parameter_File>  <denom=1000>  <nsim=3*10^6>" << endl;   
63.         exit(1);   
64.     }   
65.    
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66.    // Call function to read the parameter file   
67.     char * param_filename = argv[1];   
68.     Parameters init = read_param_file(param_filename);   
69.    
70.    
71.     // 1.2 Read denominator   
72.     //---------------------   
73.    
74.     char denom_default [] = "1000";       
75.     char *denom_str_ptr = denom_default;   
76.    
77.     // Read it from command line if it was specified   
78.     if (argc > 2)   
79.         denom_str_ptr = argv[2];   
80.    
81.     double denom  = atoi(denom_str_ptr);   
82.    
83.    
84.     // 1.3 Read number of simulations   
85.     //-------------------------------   
86.    
87.     char nsim_default  [] = "5000000";   
88.     char  *nsim_str_ptr = nsim_default;   
89.            
90.     // Read it from command line if it was specified   
91.     if (argc > 3)   
92.         nsim_str_ptr = argv[3];   
93.    
94.     unsigned nsim   = atoi( nsim_str_ptr);   
95.    
96.    
97.     // 2. Generate MCMC outfilename   
98.     //-------------------------------   
99.        
100.     // OutFileName = param_filename  + '_' + denom_str_ptr + '_' + nsim_str_ptr   
101.    
102.     int outfilename_length = strlen(param_filename) + strlen(denom_str_ptr) +   
103.                              strlen(nsim_str_ptr) + 3;  // +3 since '\0' + 2*'_'   
104.    
105.     char mcmc_outfilename [outfilename_length];   
106.     strcpy(mcmc_outfilename, param_filename);   
107.     strcat(mcmc_outfilename, "_");   
108.     strcat(mcmc_outfilename, denom_str_ptr);   
109.     strcat(mcmc_outfilename, "_");   
110.     strcat(mcmc_outfilename, nsim_str_ptr);   
111.        
112.    
113.    
114.     // 3. Start MCMC   
115.     //---------------   
116.       
117.     unsigned endDate = Sep27+1;         //+1 because Sep27 is inclusive   
118.    
119.     init_gsl_matrix_workspace();   
120.     MCMC (endDate, init, denom, nsim, mcmc_outfilename);      
121.     free_gsl_matrix_workspace();   
122.     return 0;   





1. // PROGRAM NAME: M3sim.cpp   
2. // AUTHOR: Carlos Chau   
3. //   
4. // PURPOSE: This script contains the main function of the program 'M3sim',   
5. //          which is a model that simulates the first wave of Pandemic (H1N1)   
6. //          2009 in Hong Kong from 01 June 2009 onwards. M3sim is designed   
7. //          to be used for simulating the model once the posterior distribution   
8. //          of the model parameters have been obtained (via 'M3mcmc').   
9. //   
10. // INCLUDED FILES:    
11. //          This script includes "M3Functions.cpp", which is where the   
12. //          surveillance data, implementation of the model and the inference   
13. //          (Bayesian inference + Markov Chain Monte Carlo) are written in.   
14. //   
15. //   
16. // INPUT:   1. Parameter File (containing the values of the model parameters)   
17. //   
18. //          2. Duration of the epidemic in days [default 117, which is 27 Sep]   
19. //             (counting starts from 01 June.  E.g. 1 if the last day of the   
20. //             epidemic is 01 June)   
21. //   
22. //   
23. // OUTPUT:  1. A file containing the daily incidence of the epidemic for the 3   
24. //             age classes (C1-3).   
25. //             
26. //          2. If number_of_days is 117 (i.e. the simulation stops at 27 Sep),   
27. //             the log-likelihood of the model parameters will be outputted.    
28. //             
29. //   
30. // FLOW:    1. Collect input from command line arguments   
31. //          2. Simulate model epidemic   
32. //          3. Output model parameters loglikelihood (conditional)   
33. //          4. Output model epidemic data to a file   
34. //   
35. // RUN THE PROGRAM BY: (*Optional arguments)    
36. //   
37. //         ./M3sim <param_file> <*number_of_days>   
38. //    
39. //                                       
40.    
41.    
42. #include <iostream>   
43. using namespace std;   
44.    
45. #include "M3Functions.cpp"   
46.    
47.    
48. int main(int argc, char** argv)   
49. {   
50.    
51.     // 1.1 Read Parameter File     
52.     //-------------------------   
53.    
54.     // Check if Parameter File was specified   
55.     if (argc < 2)   
56.     {   
57.         cout << "Usage: " << argv[0]    
58.              << " <Parameter_File> <Number_of_days_from_01_Jun = 117 (27 Sep)>"    
59.              << endl;   
60.    
61.         exit(1);   
62.     }   
63.        
64.     // Read in Parameters   
65.     char * param_filename = argv[1];   
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66.     Parameters param = read_param_file(param_filename);   
67.    
68.        
69.     // 1.2 Read the duration of the epidemic    
70.     // ------------------------------------   
71.    
72.     //Get last epidemic date   
73.     unsigned endDate = Sep27;   
74.        
75.     if(argc == 3)   
76.         endDate = atoi(argv[2]);   
77.    
78.     endDate += 1;      //+1 because the last day is inclusive   
79.    
80.    
81.    
82.     // 2. Simulate Epidemic     
83.     //----------------------   
84.    
85.     init_gsl_matrix_workspace();    // For the model function   
86.    
87.     double modelC1[endDate], modelC2[endDate], modelC3[endDate];   
88.     model(param, endDate, modelC1, modelC2, modelC3);   
89.       
90.    
91.    
92.     // 3. Output model parameters log-likelihood   
93.     //------------------------------------------   
94.    
95.     // If the model simulation ends on 27 September   
96.     if (endDate == Sep27+1)   
97.     {   
98.       cout << "Log-likelihood = " << lnlikelihood(param, endDate)     
99.            << "  (for DIC calculations)" << endl;   
100.     }   
101.    
102.     free_gsl_matrix_workspace();   
103.    
104.    
105.     // 4. Save Epidemic to File   
106.     //-------------------------   
107.    
108.     // OutFileName = param_filename + 'E'   
109.     char epidemic_outfilename [strlen(param_filename)+3];   
110.     strcpy(epidemic_outfilename, param_filename);   
111.     strcat(epidemic_outfilename, "E");   
112.        
113.     // Create file stream   
114.     FILE * outfile = fopen(epidemic_outfilename, "w");   
115.        
116.     // Print Header line   
117.     fprintf(outfile, "\tB1\tB2\tB3\n");   
118.        
119.     // Print epidemic to file    
120.     // Note: model stores incidence data from Jun01 - endDate, but only data   
121.     // from Jun08 through Sep25 is desired for comparison with eflu data (that   
122.     // goes from Jun10 through Sep27) - report_delay assumed to be 2 days   
123.    
124.     for(int i = Jun10-report_delay; i < endDate-report_delay; i++)   
125.         fprintf(outfile, "%i\t%.15f\t%.15f\t%.15f\n",    
126.                          i+1, modelC1[i], modelC2[i], modelC3[i]);   
127.    
128.     // Close file stream   
129.     fclose(outfile);       
130.    
131.     return 0;   




1. // PROGRAM NAME: M3Functions.cpp   
2. // AUTHOR: Carlos Chau   
3. //   
4. // PURPOSE: This script contains the functions of the programs 'M3mcmc' and   
5. //          'M3sim' and the data.   
6. //   
7. // FUNCTIONS:    
8. //   
9. //     init_gsl_matrix_workspace   
10. //       initilaises the gsl workspace variables for matrix computation. This   
11. //       function must be called before model is called.   
12. //   
13. //     free_gsl_eigen_workspace   
14. //       frees the memory from gsl workspace variable declarations   
15. //   
16. //     model   
17. //       simulates the epidemic given the model parameters by Euler integration.   
18. //       initi_gsl_eigen_workspace must be called first before model is called   
19. //   
20. //     lnPoisson   
21. //       computes poisson probability and returns it in natural-logged format   
22. //   
23. //     lnlikelihood   
24. //       computes the poisson loglikelihood of the model and the data   
25. //   
26. //     MCMC   
27. //       implements the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm to generate MCMC sample of   
28. //       the parameters. Parameter value at each iteration of the MCMC are   
29. //       output to file   
30. //   
31. //     check_bound   
32. //       checks at each iteration of the MCMC the value of the parameters to   
33. //       ensure it lies inside the allowed boundary. If a parameter went out of   
34. //       bound, it would be set to the boundary value.   
35. //   
36. //     read_param_file   
37. //       reads parameter values from file   
38. //   
39. //   
40. //   
41. // CALCULATION TRICKS:   
42. //   
43. //   Acceptance Ratio Calculation   
44. //   ----------------------------   
45. //   The program uses the poisson distribution Po(x ; lambda) as the   
46. //   goodness-of-fit metric.   
47. //   
48. //   The formula of the log poisson density is:   
49. //      
50. //       log(Po(x ; lamdba)) = -lamda + x * log(lambda) - log_gamma(x+1)   
51. //      
52. //      
53. //   Insight: x is the obesrved data and is unchanged throughout the MCMC!   
54. //      
55. //   When calculating the acceptance ratio in the MCMC, one does not need to   
56. //   compute the "- log_gamma(x+1)" part of the log posterior density for both   
57. //   current and candidate param values since they cancel out each other!   
58. //   
59. //   But this is currently NOT IMPLEMENTED since it is not known whether   
60. //   neglecting x! would affect DIC.   
61. //   
62.    
63.    




66. #include <fstream>   
67. #include <sstream>   
68. #include <cstring>   
69. #include <time.h>   
70. #include <gsl/gsl_rng.h>   
71. #include <gsl/gsl_randist.h>   
72. #include <gsl/gsl_blas.h>   
73. #include <gsl/gsl_eigen.h>   
74. #include <gsl/gsl_sf_log.h>   
75. #include <gsl/gsl_sf_gamma.h>   
76. #include <gsl/gsl_eigen.h>   
77. #include <gsl/gsl_rng.h>   
78. #include <gsl/gsl_randist.h>   
79. using namespace std;   
80.    
81.    
82. /*****************************************************************  
83.   
84.                               Class  
85.   
86.  ****************************************************************/   
87.    
88. class Parameters   
89. {   
90.     public:   
91.         double M1;   
92.         double M2;   
93.         double M3;   
94.         double R0;   
95.         double h1;   
96.         double h2;   
97.         double p;   
98.         double q;   
99.         double r;   
100. };   
101.    
102.    
103. /*****************************************************************  
104.   
105.                             Variables  
106.   
107.  ****************************************************************/   
108.    
109. // Housekeeping   
110. #define NUM_CLASS 3   
111. const unsigned report_delay = 2;   
112. const unsigned dt_denom = 20;         
113. const double dt  = 1.0/dt_denom;   //0.05   
114. const double Inf = 9e10;   
115.    
116. // Population size   
117. const double N_C1 = 731060;   
118. const double N_C2 = 585740;   
119. const double N_C3 = 5715900;   
120.    
121. // Transmission Characteristics Assumptions   
122. const double Tg = 3;   
123. const double gamm_dt = 1/Tg * dt;   
124.    
125.    
126. // Event Dates   
127. const unsigned Jun01 = 0;     // Model start date   
128. const unsigned Jun10 = 9;     // Local transmission first detected   
129. const unsigned Jun12 = 11;    // C1 schools closure began   
130. const unsigned Jul11 = 40;    // C2 schools closure began (summer holiday)   
131. const unsigned Aug27 = 87;    // Date which Wu et al.(2010) uses data up to   
132. const unsigned Sep01 = 92;    // Start of new school season   
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133. const unsigned Sep27 = 118;   // Last day Enhanced surveillance was effective   
134. const unsigned Sep30 = 121;   // Last day surveillance data was available   
135.    
136. // Event dates in dt scale   
137. const unsigned Jun01_dt = Jun01*dt_denom;   
138. const unsigned Jun10_dt = Jun10*dt_denom;   
139. const unsigned Jun12_dt = Jun12*dt_denom;   
140. const unsigned Jul11_dt = Jul11*dt_denom;   
141. const unsigned Sep01_dt = Sep01*dt_denom;   
142.    
143. // Model Parameter Boundary values   
144. double  M_Bound[] = {0,10};   
145. double R0_Bound[] = {1,2};   
146. double hp_Bound[] = {0,10};   
147. double qr_Bound[] = {0,1};   
148.    
149.    
150. //Contact Matrix   
151. //GCM = Germany Contact Matrix (POLYMOD non-physical contacts)   
152. double GCM[] = {2.93, 1.23, 0.52,           
153.                 1.12, 3.98, 0.65,   
154.                 4.98, 4.79, 6.72};   
155.                    
156. unsigned GCM_SIZE = NUM_CLASS * NUM_CLASS;   
157.    
158.    
159.    
160. // GSL eigen workspace variables     
161. gsl_vector_complex           *eigen_values;   
162. gsl_matrix_complex           *eigen_vectors;   
163. gsl_eigen_nonsymmv_workspace *eigen_workspace;   
164.    
165.    
166. // Eflu Data   
167. // Number of cases confirmed per day from Jun10 through Sep27   
168. const double efluC1[] = {0,0,1,0,0,3,0,5,9,3,4,9,4,14,5,8,13,8,15,5,9,4,5,7,4,8,   
169.                          4,8,11,19,16,11,11,10,11,21,18,19,17,16,21,12,22,29,29,   
170.                          25, 42,33,58,56,48,71,70,64,80,83,75,77,82,63,82,67,84,   
171.                          85,63,65,59,74,57,76,94,92,103,104,117,97,166,131,131,   
172.                          144,138,130,85,137,129,208,161,178,168,157,276,283,273,   
173.                          241,347,296,321,316,401,434,398,392,266,233,405,380,   
174.                          405,308,421,242};   
175.    
176. const double efluC2[] = {1,11,2,5,6,4,9,30,28,10,9,32,18,35,21,27,42,8,20,14,27,   
177.                          14,8,13,9,8,8,14,9,8,9,14,10,18,18,13,11,15,25,16,20,   
178.                          18,34,22,47,65,76,39,56,51,33,45,54,33,54,54,59,62,44,   
179.                          40,49,41,33,32,34,40,39,48,67,60,81,68,63,61,42,35,73,   
180.                          56,71,56,74,51,49,66,69,101,64,68,82,57,108,99,121,115,   
181.                          149,139,163,165,188,197,166,192,122,117,190,172,206,137   
182.                          ,142,107};   
183.    
184. const double efluC3[] = {3,2,5,4,2,4,5,14,11,3,7,17,5,11,9,21,35,13,27,10,22,21,   
185.                          16,18,12,10,7,17,18,26,38,32,6,32,29,43,52,46,56,30,34,   
186.                          42,57,58,60,61,61,72,104,72,91,90,107,65,72,95,111,85,   
187.                          108,96,81,83,65,101,110,119,87,124,119,111,170,144,160,   
188.                          134,112,113,167,146,177,181,186,150,95,125,123,183,145,   
189.                          129,134,72,120,108,120,137,129,94,95,107,94,145,137,   
190.                          133,104,96,126,125,172,179,210,119};   
191.    
192.    
193.    
194. /*****************************************************************  
195.   
196.                             Functions  
197.   
198.  ****************************************************************/   
199.    
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200. // Function Declarations    
201. void print_param (Parameters);   
202. void print_epidemic (unsigned, double*, double*, double*);   
203. void print_matrix_array(double *);   
204. void print_matrix (gsl_matrix *m);   
205. void model(Parameters , unsigned , double*, double*, double*);   
206.    
207.    
208.    
209. // FUNCTION: init_gsl_matrix_workspace   
210. // PURPOSE: initilaises the gsl workspace variables for matrix computation. This   
211. //          function must be called before model is called.   
212. // CALLED FROM: main   
213. void init_gsl_matrix_workspace()   
214. {   
215.     eigen_values  = gsl_vector_complex_alloc(NUM_CLASS);   
216.     eigen_vectors = gsl_matrix_complex_alloc(NUM_CLASS, NUM_CLASS);   
217.     eigen_workspace   = gsl_eigen_nonsymmv_alloc(NUM_CLASS);   
218. }   
219.    
220. // FUNCTION: free_gsl_matrix_workspace   
221. // PURPOSE:  frees the memory from gsl workspace variable declarations   
222. // CALLED FROM: main   
223. void free_gsl_matrix_workspace()   
224. {   
225.     gsl_eigen_nonsymmv_free(eigen_workspace);   
226.     gsl_vector_complex_free(eigen_values);   
227.     gsl_matrix_complex_free(eigen_vectors);   
228. }   
229.    
230.    
231.    
232. // FUNCTION: model   
233. // PURPOSE: simulates the epidemic given the model parameters.   
234.    
235. // PARAMETERS:   
236. // name     type           value/reference    description   
237. // ----------------------------------------------------------------------------   
238. // param    Parameters       value            Model parameter values   
239. // endDate  unsigned         value            End date of epidemic simulation   
240. // modelC1  double array     reference        For storing daily incidence in C1   
241. // modelC2  double array     reference        For storing daily incidence in C2   
242. // modelC3  double array     reference        For storing daily incidence in C3   
243. //   
244. // CALLED FROM: main, MCMC   
245. //   
246. // FLOW:   
247. //     1. Compute the WAIFW matrix according to R0   
248. //     2. Compute WAIFW matrices for different periods of school sessions   
249. //     3. Simulate the epidemic by Euler method (dt == 0.05)   
250. //     4. Convert incidence in dt time scale into daily.   
251. //     5. Incorporate Reporting rate   
252.    
253. void model(Parameters param, unsigned endDate, double modelC1[],    
254.            double modelC2[], double modelC3[])   
255. {   
256.     // 1. Compute the WAIFW matrix according to R0   
257.     //--------------------------------------------   
258.    
259.     // 1.1 Copy german contact matrix data & incorporate relative susceptibility   
260.     //    C1 is h1 times more susceptible compared to C3   
261.     //    C2 is h2 times more susceptible compared to C3   
262.    
263.     double CM_h_array[GCM_SIZE];    
264.        
265.     for(unsigned i = 0; i < GCM_SIZE; i++)   
266.     {   
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267.        //C1, times it by h1   
268.         if (i < NUM_CLASS)            
269.             CM_h_array[i] = GCM[i] * (1+param.h1);   
270.                
271.         //C2, times it by h2   
272.         else if (i < 2*NUM_CLASS)     
273.             CM_h_array[i] = GCM[i] * (1+param.h2);   
274.                
275.         //C3   
276.         else                         
277.             CM_h_array[i] = GCM[i];   
278.     }   
279.    
280.            
281.     // 1.2 Multiply CM by Tg to get NGM   
282.     //   
283.     double NGM_array[GCM_SIZE];   
284.    
285.     for(unsigned i = 0; i < GCM_SIZE; i++)   
286.         NGM_array[i] = CM_h_array[i] * Tg;   
287.    
288.    
289.     // 1.3 Compute scaling constant (s) from NGM   
290.     //   
291.     //     max.eigen.value(NGM * s) = R0   
292.     //     max.eigen.value(NGM)* s  = R0   
293.     //                           s  = R0 / max.eigen.value(NGM)   
294.    
295.     // Convert NGM_array into matrix_view type   
296.     gsl_matrix_view NGM = gsl_matrix_view_array(NGM_array, NUM_CLASS, NUM_CLASS);   
297.        
298.     // Compute the eigen values of NGM   
299.     // Note: NGM is a matrix_view object, NGM.matrix gives the matrix   
300.     gsl_eigen_nonsymmv (&NGM.matrix, eigen_values, eigen_vectors, eigen_workspace);   
301.    
302.     // Sort the eigen values by their absolute magnitude   
303.     gsl_eigen_nonsymmv_sort (eigen_values, eigen_vectors, GSL_EIGEN_SORT_ABS_DESC);   
304.    
305.     // Get the max eigen value   
306.     gsl_complex leading_eigen_value = gsl_vector_complex_get(eigen_values, 0);   
307.        
308.     // Get the real part of the eigen value (a complex number)   
309.     double leading_eigen_value_Real = GSL_REAL(leading_eigen_value);   
310.    
311.     // Compute the scaling constants   
312.     double s = param.R0 / leading_eigen_value_Real;   
313.    
314.        
315.    
316.     // 2. Compute WAIFW matrices for different periods of school sessions   
317.     //-------------------------------------------------------------------   
318.     //   
319.     // W = CM * H *  s * dt/ N   
320.     //   
321.     // Note: W is in dt scale   
322.        
323.     double N [] = {N_C1, N_C1, N_C1,   
324.                    N_C2, N_C2, N_C2,   
325.                    N_C3, N_C3, N_C3};   
326.        
327.     double       W_array [GCM_SIZE];   
328.     double W_Jun12_array [GCM_SIZE];   
329.     double W_Jul11_array [GCM_SIZE];   
330.        
331.    
332.    
333.     
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334.     //            [ 0      1       2   ]   
335.     //            [                    ]   
336.     //  M_config =[ 3      4       5   ]   
337.     //            [                    ]   
338.     //            [ 6      7       8   ]   
339.     //   
340.     //   
341.     //            [h1*(1-q)  h1       h1(1+p) ]   
342.     //            [                           ]   
343.     //  W_Jun12 = [h2        h2       h2      ]   
344.     //            [                           ]   
345.     //            [1(1+p)    1        1       ]   
346.     //   
347.     //   
348.     //            [h1*(1-q)  h1        h1(1+p) ]   
349.     //            [                            ]   
350.     //  W_Jul11 = [h2        h2*(1-q)  h2(1+p) ]   
351.     //            [                            ]   
352.     //            [1(1+p)    1(1+p)    1       ]   
353.     //   
354.    
355.     // Compute W = CM * H * s * dt / N   
356.     // Note: CM * H is already in CM_h_array   
357.     for(unsigned i = 0; i < GCM_SIZE; i++)   
358.         W_array[i] = CM_h_array[i] * s * dt / N[i];   
359.    
360.     // Copy W to W_Jun12, W_Jul11   
361.     for(unsigned i = 0; i < GCM_SIZE; i++)   
362.         W_Jun12_array[i] = W_Jul11_array[i] = W_array[i];   
363.        
364.     // Discount slot 0 of W_Jun12 & W_Jul11 by (1-q)   
365.     W_Jun12_array[0] = W_Jul11_array[0] = W_array[0] * (1-param.q);   
366.        
367.     // Discount slot 4 of W_Jul11 by (1-q)   
368.     W_Jul11_array[4] = W_array[4] * (1-param.q);   
369.        
370.     // Increase W_Jun12, W_Jul11 slot 2, 6,  W_Jul11 slot 5,7 by (1+p)   
371.     W_Jun12_array[2] = W_Jul11_array[2] = W_array[2] * (1+param.p);     //slot 2   
372.     W_Jun12_array[6] = W_Jul11_array[6] = W_array[6] * (1+param.p);     //slot 6   
373.     W_Jul11_array[5] = W_array[5] * (1+param.p);                        //slot 5   
374.     W_Jul11_array[7] = W_array[7] * (1+param.p);                        //slot 7   
375.      
376.    
377.     // Convert W_array, W_Jul12_array, W_Jul11 into matrix_view objects   
378.     gsl_matrix_view W       = gsl_matrix_view_array(      W_array, NUM_CLASS, NUM_CLASS); 
379.     gsl_matrix_view W_Jun12 = gsl_matrix_view_array(W_Jun12_array, NUM_CLASS, NUM_CLASS); 
380.     gsl_matrix_view W_Jul11 = gsl_matrix_view_array(W_Jul11_array, NUM_CLASS, NUM_CLASS); 
381.        
382.    
383.    
384.     // 3. Simulate the epidemic by Euler method   
385.     //-----------------------------------------   
386.     //   
387.    
388.     // 3.1 Preparations before simulations   
389.     // Specify initial conditions in array format   
390.     double   S0_array[] = {N_C1, N_C2, N_C3};   
391.     double   I0_array[] = {0,0,0};   
392.     double M_dt_array[] = {param.M1*dt, param.M2*dt, param.M3*dt};   
393.     double  FOI_array[NUM_CLASS];   
394.     double  FOR_array[NUM_CLASS] = {gamm_dt, gamm_dt, gamm_dt};   
395.    
396.     // Convert them into vector_view objects   
397.     // Note:   
398.     //     FOI = Force of Infection   
399.     //     FOR = Force of Recovery   
400.     gsl_vector_view   S_t = gsl_vector_view_array (  S0_array, NUM_CLASS);   
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401.     gsl_vector_view   I_t = gsl_vector_view_array (  I0_array, NUM_CLASS);   
402.     gsl_vector_view FOI_t = gsl_vector_view_array ( FOI_array, NUM_CLASS);   
403.     gsl_vector_view   FOR = gsl_vector_view_array ( FOR_array, NUM_CLASS);   
404.     gsl_vector_view  M_dt = gsl_vector_view_array (M_dt_array, NUM_CLASS);   
405.    
406.     // Set up variable matrix pointer W_t_ptr, which will point to W, W_Jun12,   
407.     // W_Jul11 during simulation   
408.     gsl_matrix * W_t_matrix_ptr = &W.matrix;   
409.    
410.     // Declare arrays for storing incidences in dt scale   
411.     unsigned course_dt = (unsigned) (endDate)*dt_denom;   
412.     double modelC1_dt[course_dt];   
413.     double modelC2_dt[course_dt];   
414.     double modelC3_dt[course_dt];   
415.    
416.    
417.     // 3.2 Simulate the epidemic    
418.     //   
419.     for (unsigned t = Jun01_dt; t < course_dt; t++)   
420.     {   
421.         // Check if schools were closed on the day, if so, change W_t   
422.         if (t == Jun12_dt)           
423.             W_t_matrix_ptr = &W_Jun12.matrix;   
424.            
425.         if (t == Jul11_dt)   
426.             W_t_matrix_ptr = &W_Jul11.matrix;   
427.                
428.         if (t == Sep01_dt)   
429.             W_t_matrix_ptr = &W.matrix;   
430.    
431.                
432.         // 3.2.1. Calculate the number of individuals that have been infected   
433.         //        during t to t+dt   
434.         //   
435.            
436.         // Calculate FOI_t by multiplying W_t with I_t. Result is stored in   
437.         // FOI_t.vector   
438.         //    
439.         gsl_blas_dgemv (CblasNoTrans, 1.0, W_t_matrix_ptr, &I_t.vector, 0.0,    
440.                         &FOI_t.vector);   
441.    
442.         // Calculate the number of individuals infected by multiplying S_t by   
443.         // FOI_t   
444.         //   
445.         // Note: gsl_vector_mul (a, b) stores results in 'a' while 'b' remains   
446.         //       unchanged. So the 'number of individuals infected during t to   
447.         //       t+dt is stored in FOI_t.vector   
448.         //   
449.         gsl_vector_mul (&FOI_t.vector, &S_t.vector);   
450.            
451.         // 3.2.2. Calculate the number of individuals that have recovered during   
452.         //        t to t+dt   
453.         //   
454.         // Note: FOR.vector holds the number of recovered individuals from the   
455.         //       last iteration, so need to refresh its value to gamm_dt before   
456.         //       the multiplication   
457.         //   
458.         for(int i = 0; i < NUM_CLASS; i++)   
459.             gsl_vector_set(&FOR.vector, i, gamm_dt);   
460.            
461.         //FOR.vector now stores the number of individuals recovered during t to   
462.         //t+dt   
463.         gsl_vector_mul (&FOR.vector, &I_t.vector);   
464.            
465.            
466.         // 3.3.3. Record incidence during t to t+dt   
467.         //   
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468.         modelC1_dt [t] = gsl_vector_get (&FOI_t.vector, 0);   
469.         modelC2_dt [t] = gsl_vector_get (&FOI_t.vector, 1);   
470.         modelC3_dt [t] = gsl_vector_get (&FOI_t.vector, 2);   
471.            
472.         // 3.3.4. Update S_t+1 & I_t+1   
473.         //    
474.         // Note: gsl_vector_sub (a, b) stores result in 'a' while 'b' remains   
475.         // unchanged   
476.         //   
477.            
478.         //S_t+1 = S_t - newlyInfected_t   
479.         gsl_vector_sub (&S_t.vector, &FOI_t.vector);   
480.            
481.         //I_t+1 = I_t + newlyInfected_t + imported_cases - recovered.cases   
482.         gsl_vector_add (&I_t.vector, &FOI_t.vector);   
483.         gsl_vector_add (&I_t.vector,  &M_dt.vector);   
484.         gsl_vector_sub (&I_t.vector,   &FOR.vector);   
485.     }   
486.        
487.        
488.     // 4. Convert incidence from dt scale to daily scale   
489.     //--------------------------------------------------   
490.            
491.     for(int i = 0; i < endDate; i++)   
492.     {      
493.         double C1_i = 0;   
494.         double C2_i = 0;   
495.         double C3_i = 0;   
496.    
497.         int j_start = i * dt_denom;   
498.    
499.         for(int j = j_start; j < j_start + dt_denom; j++)   
500.         {   
501.             C1_i += modelC1_dt [j];   
502.             C2_i += modelC2_dt [j];   
503.             C3_i += modelC3_dt [j];   
504.         }   
505.            
506.         modelC1[i] = C1_i;   
507.         modelC2[i] = C2_i;   
508.         modelC3[i] = C3_i;   
509.     }   
510.        
511.     // 5. Incorporate Reporting rate   
512.     //------------------------------   
513.        
514.     for (int t = Jun01; t < endDate; t++)   
515.     {   
516.         modelC1[t] *= param.r;   
517.         modelC2[t] *= param.r;   
518.         modelC3[t] *= param.r;   
519.     }       
520. }   
521.    
522.    
523. // NAME: lnPoisson   
524. // PURPOSE: computes poisson probability and returns it in natural-logged format   
525. //    
526. // PARAMETERS:   
527. // name     type     value/reference    description   
528. // ----------------------------------------------------------------------------   
529. // x        double   value              observed   
530. // lambda   double   value              expected   
531. //   
532. // RETURN:    
533. // name     type     value/reference    description   
534. // ----------------------------------------------------------------------------   
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535. // lnlik    double   value              log-likelihood of lambda given x   
536. //   
537. // CALLED FROM: lnlikelihood   
538. double lnPoisson (double x, double lambda)   
539. {   
540.     if (lambda == 0)   
541.         return -Inf;   
542.    
543.     // Po(x;lambda) = exp(-lambda) * lambda^x / x!   
544.     // ln(Po(x;lambda)) = -lambda + x*ln(lambda) - lngamma(x + 1)    
545.     // Note: x! = gamma(x+1)   
546.    
547.     double ln_lambda         = gsl_sf_log(lambda);   
548.     double ln_gamma_x_plus_1 = gsl_sf_lngamma(x+1);   
549.     double lnlik = -lambda + x*ln_lambda - ln_gamma_x_plus_1;   
550.    
551.     return lnlik;   
552. }   
553.    
554.    
555. // NAME: lnlikelihood   
556. // PURPOSE: computes the poisson loglikelihood of the model and the data   
557. //    
558. // PARAMETERS:   
559. // name     type        value/reference    description   
560. // ----------------------------------------------------------------------------   
561. // p        Parameters  value              model parameter   
562. // endDate  endDate     value              End date of the simulated epidemic   
563. //   
564. // RETURN:    
565. // name     type        value/reference    description   
566. // ----------------------------------------------------------------------------   
567. // lnlik    double      value              log-likelihood of the parameters   
568. //                                         given the data   
569. //   
570. // CALLED FROM: MCMC   
571. double lnlikelihood (Parameters p, unsigned endDate)   
572. {   
573.     // 1. Simulate epidemic given parameters   
574.     double modelC1[endDate];   
575.     double modelC2[endDate];   
576.     double modelC3[endDate];   
577.        
578.     model(p, endDate, modelC1, modelC2, modelC3);   
579.        
580.     // 2. Calculate the poisson log likelihood between model & data   
581.     double lnlik = 0;   
582.        
583.     // eflu[0] -> Jun10   
584.     //model[0] -> Jun01   
585.     unsigned model_delay = 7;   
586.     unsigned delay = model_delay + report_delay;   
587.        
588.     for (unsigned i = Jun10; i < endDate; i++)   
589.     {   
590.         lnlik += lnPoisson (efluC1[i-delay], modelC1[i]);   
591.         lnlik += lnPoisson (efluC2[i-delay], modelC2[i]);   
592.         lnlik += lnPoisson (efluC3[i-delay], modelC3[i]);   
593.     }   
594.        
595.     return lnlik;   
596. }   
597.    
598. // NAME: check_bound   
599. // PURPOSE: checks at each iteration of the MCMC the value of the parameters to   
600. //          ensure it lies inside the allowed boundary. If a parameter went out   
601. //          of bound, it would be set to the boundary value.   
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602. //    
603. // PARAMETERS:   
604. // name     type        value/reference    description   
605. // ----------------------------------------------------------------------------   
606. // value    Parameters  value              the value of a parameter   
607. // bound    double      reference          array storing the upper and lower   
608. //                                         bound of the parameter   
609. //   
610. // CALLED FROM: MCMC   
611. void check_bound (double & value, double bound[])   
612. {   
613.     if(value < bound[0])   
614.         value = bound[0];   
615.            
616.     if(value > bound[1])   
617.         value = bound[1];   
618. }   
619.    
620.    
621.    
622. // NAME: MCMC   
623. // PURPOSE: implements the Metropolis-Hastings algorithm to generate MCMC sample   
624. //          of the parameters. Parameter value at each iteration of the MCMC are   
625. //          output to file   
626. //   
627. // PARAMETERS:   
628. // name        type        value/reference    description   
629. // ----------------------------------------------------------------------------   
630. // endDate     unsigned    value              End date of the simulated epidemic   
631. // param_cur   Parameters  value              Model parameters   
632. // denom       double      value              Denominator for dividing stepsize    
633. //                                            of the proposal distribution   
634. // nsim        unsigned    value              Number of MCMC simulations   
635. // outfilename char        reference          Name of the outfile for storing    
636. //                                            the MCMC samples   
637. //   
638. // CALLED FROM: MCMC   
639. //   
640. // FLOW:   
641. //    1. Open outfile stream   
642. //    2. Set up GSL random number generator   
643. //    3. Calculate proposal distribution stepsizes   
644. //    4. Start MCMC sampling   
645. void MCMC (unsigned endDate, Parameters param_cur, double denom, unsigned nsim,    
646.            char* outfilename)   
647. {       
648.     //1. Open outfile stream   
649.     //----------------------   
650.     FILE * outfile = fopen(outfilename, "a");   
651.    
652.     //print header line   
653.     fprintf(outfile, "M1\tM2\tM3\tR0\th1\th2\tp\tq\tr\tlk\n");   
654.        
655.     // 2. Set up GSL Random number generator    
656.     //-------------------------------------   
657.     const gsl_rng_type * T;   
658.     gsl_rng_env_setup();   
659.    
660.     T = gsl_rng_default;   
661.     gsl_rng * r = gsl_rng_alloc (T);   
662.     gsl_rng_set(r, time(0));   
663.        
664.        
665.     // 3. Calculate proposal dsitribution stepsizes   
666.     //---------------------------------------------   
667.     double  M_step = ( M_Bound[1] -  M_Bound[0])/denom;   
668.     double R0_step = (R0_Bound[1] - R0_Bound[0])/denom;   
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669.     double hp_step = (hp_Bound[1] - hp_Bound[0])/denom;   
670.     double qr_step = (qr_Bound[1] - qr_Bound[0])/denom;   
671.    
672.        
673.     // 4. Start MCMC samping   
674.     //----------------------   
675.    
676.     // Count the number of iterations accepted   
677.     unsigned accepted = 0;   
678.    
679.     //Compute current likelihood   
680.     double lnlik_cur = lnlikelihood (param_cur, endDate);   
681.        
682.    
683.     for(unsigned i = 0; i < nsim; i++)   
684.     {   
685.         // Output progess at every 10^5 iterations completed   
686.         if (i % 100000 == 0)   
687.         {   
688.             double accept_rate = (i == 0 ? 0 : accepted*1.0/i);   
689.             printf("%i out of %i\tAcceptance rate: %.3f\n", i, nsim, accept_rate);   
690.         }   
691.        
692.         // Generate Candidate Parameters   
693.         Parameters param_cand = param_cur;   
694.            
695.         param_cand.M1 += gsl_ran_flat(r,  -M_step,  M_step);   
696.         param_cand.M2 += gsl_ran_flat(r,  -M_step,  M_step);   
697.         param_cand.M3 += gsl_ran_flat(r,  -M_step,  M_step);   
698.         param_cand.R0 += gsl_ran_flat(r, -R0_step, R0_step);   
699.         param_cand.h1 += gsl_ran_flat(r, -hp_step, hp_step);   
700.         param_cand.h2 += gsl_ran_flat(r, -hp_step, hp_step);   
701.         param_cand.p  += gsl_ran_flat(r, -hp_step, hp_step);   
702.         param_cand.q  += gsl_ran_flat(r, -qr_step, qr_step);         
703.         param_cand.r  += gsl_ran_flat(r, -qr_step, qr_step);   
704.    
705.                    
706.         // Check if candidate parameters are inbound   
707.         // if exceed boundary, set them to boundary value   
708.         check_bound(param_cand.M1,  M_Bound);   
709.         check_bound(param_cand.M2,  M_Bound);   
710.         check_bound(param_cand.M3,  M_Bound);   
711.         check_bound(param_cand.R0, R0_Bound);   
712.         check_bound(param_cand.h1, hp_Bound);   
713.         check_bound(param_cand.h2, hp_Bound);   
714.         check_bound(param_cand.p , hp_Bound);   
715.         check_bound(param_cand.q , qr_Bound);   
716.         check_bound(param_cand.r,  qr_Bound);   
717.            
718.            
719.         // Simulate epidemic curve based on candidate parameters and calculate   
720.         // likelihood   
721.         double lnlik_cand = lnlikelihood (param_cand, endDate);   
722.            
723.         // Pick a random number from U[0,1] and log it for determining   
724.         // acceptance or rejection of the candidate parameters   
725.         double ln_alpha = gsl_sf_log (gsl_ran_flat(r, 0, 1));   
726.    
727.    
728.         // Metropolis step           
729.         if(ln_alpha < lnlik_cand - lnlik_cur)   
730.         {   
731.             accepted++;   
732.             lnlik_cur = lnlik_cand;   
733.             param_cur = param_cand;   
734.         }   
735.            
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736.            
737.         // Output parameter values of the current iteration   
738.         fprintf(outfile,   
739.                 "%.15E\t%.15E\t%.15E\t%.15E\t%.15E\t%.15E\t%.15E\t%.15E\t%.15E\t%.15E\n", 
740.                 param_cur.M1, param_cur.M2, param_cur.M3,    
741.                 param_cur.R0, param_cur.h1, param_cur.h2,    
742.                 param_cur.p,  param_cur.q,  param_cur.r,   
743.                 lnlik_cur   
744.                 );   
745.     } 
746.        
747.     fclose(outfile);   
748.     gsl_rng_free(r);   
749. } 
750.    
751.    
752.    
753.    
754. // NAME: read_param_file   
755. // PURPOSE: reads parameter values from file   
756. //    
757. // PARAMETERS:   
758. // name            type        value/reference    description   
759. // ----------------------------------------------------------------------------   
760. // param_filename  char        reference          Name of parameter file   
761. //   
762. // RETURN:   
763. // name            type        value/reference    description   
764. // ----------------------------------------------------------------------------   
765. // param           Parameters  value              Parameter values from the file   
766. //   
767. //    
768. Parameters read_param_file (char * param_filename)   
769. {   
770.     Parameters param;   
771.    
772.     ifstream paramFile(param_filename);   
773.     string line;   
774.        
775.     while ( getline ( paramFile, line ) )   
776.     {   
777.         stringstream ss;   
778.         ss.str( line );   
779.            
780.         string varName;   
781.         double varValue;   
782.            
783.         ss >> varName;   
784.         ss >> varValue;   
785.            
786.         if (varName == "M1") param.M1 = varValue;   
787.         if (varName == "M2") param.M2 = varValue;   
788.         if (varName == "M3") param.M3 = varValue;   
789.         if (varName == "R0") param.R0 = varValue;   
790.         if (varName == "h1") param.h1 = varValue;   
791.         if (varName == "h2") param.h2 = varValue;   
792.         if (varName == "p")  param.p  = varValue;   
793.         if (varName == "q")  param.q  = varValue;   
794.         if (varName == "r") param.r = varValue;   
795.     }   
796.    
797.     paramFile.close();   
798.    
799.     return param;   





1. #!/usr/bin/perl   
2.    
3. # PROGRAM NAME: postmean.pl   
4. # AUTHOR: Carlos Chau   
5. #   
6. # PURPOSE: To compute the posterior mean of parameters from its MCMC samples   
7. #   
8. # INPUT:   
9. #     mcmc_filename   
10. #         The name of the file containing the MCMC samples of parameters.   
11. #         The last line of the file may be incomplete (for files which the MCMC   
12. #         run was terminated early)   
13. #         
14. #     burnin   
15. #         A number specifying the burnin period of the MCMC   
16. #   
17. # OUTPUT:    
18. #     mcmc_filename."pm"   
19. #         A file containing the computed posterior mean of parameters.   
20. #   
21. #    
22. # FLOW:   
23. #    1. Read mcmc_filename & burnin from command line arguments   
24. #    2. Read input file and compute parameter posterior mean   
25. #    3. Output result to file   
26. #    4. Notify user result is ready   
27. #   
28. # NOTE:    
29. #    the program reports progress at every 1e6 iterations completed   
30.    
31.    
32. use strict;   
33. use warnings;   
34.    
35.    
36.    
37. # 1. Read mcmc_filename & burnin from command line arguments   
38. #-----------------------------------------------------------   
39. my $argc = scalar(@ARGV);   
40.    
41.    
42. # Check the number of command line arguments   
43. # Note: Perl does not count the executable as the first cmd argument   
44. if ($argc == 0)   
45. {   
46.     print "Usage: ", $0, " <file> <burnin>\n"; # $0 is program name   
47.     exit;   
48. }   
49.    
50. my $mcmc_filename = $ARGV[0];   
51.    
52.    
53. # Check if $mcmc_filename is present   
54. if (!-e $mcmc_filename)   
55. {   
56.     print $mcmc_filename, " not present\n";   
57.     exit;   
58. }   
59.    
60.    
61. my $burnin = $ARGV[1];   
62.    
63. # Check if $burnin is a positive integer   
64. if ($burnin =~ /\D/)   
65. {   
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66.     print $burnin, " is a not positive integer!\n";   
67.     exit;   
68. }   
69.    
70.    
71.    
72. # 2. Read input file and compute parameter posterior mean   
73. #--------------------------------------------------------   
74.    
75. open(INFI, $mcmc_filename);   
76.    
77. # Header line   
78. my $header = <INFI>;   
79. chomp $header;   
80.    
81. my @param_name = split(/\t/, $header);   
82. my $num_of_param = scalar(@param_name);   
83.    
84.    
85. # Read in the MCMC file and compute posterior mean   
86.    
87. my @param_cum_value;   
88. my $lines_read = 1;   
89. my $converged_sample_count = 0;   
90.    
91. while (<INFI>)   
92. {       
93.     # Start processing after burnin   
94.     if ($lines_read > $burnin)   
95.     {   
96.         chomp $_;       # Removal ‘\n’  
97.            
98.         my @param_value = split(/\t/, $_);   
99.    
100.         # Check if the line was complete   
101.         # if so, add it to cumulative count   
102.         if (scalar(@param_value) == $num_of_param) # equal means complete line   
103.         {   
104.             for(my $i = 0; $i < $num_of_param; $i++)   
105.             {   
106.                 $param_cum_value[$i] += $param_value[$i];   
107.             }   
108.    
109.             $converged_sample_count++;   
110.         }   
111.     }   
112.        
113.     # Report progess after every 1e6 completed   
114.     if ($lines_read % 1e6 == 0)   
115.     {   
116.         print $lines_read, " lines read\n";   
117.     }   
118.    
119.     $lines_read++;   
120. }   
121.    
122. close(INFI);   
123.    
124. # Check if there was any converged sample read   
125. if ($converged_sample_count == 0)   
126. {   
127.     print "No converged sample read. Is the specified burnin correct?\n";   
128.     exit;   
129. }   
130.    
131.    
132. # 3. Output result to file   
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133. #--------------------------   
134.    
135. my $outfile = $mcmc_filename."pm";   
136.    
137. open(OUTFI, ">".$outfile);   
138.    
139. for(my $i = 0; $i < $num_of_param; $i++)   
140. {   
141.     print OUTFI $param_name[$i], "\t",   
142.                 $param_cum_value[$i] / $converged_sample_count, "\n";    
143. }   
144.    
145. close(OUTFI);   
146.    
147.    
148.    
149. # 4. Notify user result is ready   
150. #--------------------------------   
151. print "\nResult is outputted to file ", $outfile, "\n";   
DIC.R 
1. # PROGRAME NAME: DIC.R   
2. # PURPOSE: This script contains the function 'DIC' for computing model DIC score   
3. #          from its likelihood    
4. # INPUT:   
5. #    LL.bar   
6. #        Posterior mean of the model log-likelihood   
7. #        (from 'postmean.pl' computed results)   
8. #   
9. #    LL.hat   
10. #        Model loglikelihood evaluated at the posterior mean of parameters   
11. #        (from 'M3sim')   
12.    
13. DIC <- function (LL.bar, LL.hat)   
14. {   
15.     # LL.bar = Log-Likelihood posterior mean   
16.     # LL.hat = Log-Likelihood evaluated at the posterior mean of parameters   
17.    
18.     # Check the sign of LL.bar & LL.hat   
19.     if (LL.bar > 0)   
20.         stop("\nLL.bar is > 0!\nDid you forget the '-' sign?");   
21.    
22.     if (LL.hat > 0)   
23.         stop("\nLL.hat is > 0!\nDid you forget the '-' sign?");   
24.    
25.     # Function to calculate Deviance from Log-Likelihood   
26.     dev <- function (LogLikelihood)   
27.     {   
28.         -2 * LogLikelihood;   
29.     }   
30.    
31.     # D.bar = Deviance posterior mean   
32.     # D.hat = Deviance evaluated at the posterior mean of parameters   
33.     D.bar = dev(LL.bar);   
34.     D.hat = dev(LL.hat);   
35.    
36.     # DIC Calculation   
37.     #-----------------   
38.     # DIC = D.bar + pD  or  D.hat + 2pD   
39.     # pD = D.bar - D.hat    # pD is the "effective number of parameters"   
40.     pD  = D.bar - D.hat;   
41.     DIC = D.bar + pD;   
42.    
43.     return (DIC);   
44. }   
 145 
 
Appendix 9  Trace plot for MCMC samples of Model 1 parameters  






Appendix 10 Trace plot for MCMC samples of Model 2 parameters  





Appendix 11 Trace plot for MCMC samples of Model 2 parameters  
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